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ABSTRACT 
This paper will examine the process of defining a relevant market within both the New 
Zealand Commerce Act 1986 and the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in light of 
cases and writings in the major overseas antitrust systems, such as the European Common 
Market and the United States. This discussion will commence with an examination of the 
statutory definition of "market" within both the Trade Practices Act and the Commerce Act. 
The next step in the enquiry will be to analyse the product, geographic space, function and 
time dimensions of the relevant market concept that have frequently been employed by New 
Zealand and Australian authorities as an aid to the determination of the relevant market. 
Consideration will also be given to the concept of a sub-market and its utility within New 
Zealand and Australian trade practices litigation. This discussion will demonstrate that the 
approach to market definition adopted by New Zealand and Australian authorities requires a 
large amount of subjective assessment on the part of the relevant court or tribunal. 
Therefore, by way of conclusion this paper will suggest that such flexibility within this 
market definition methodology should be moderated against an increased emphasis upon 
the commercial realities of the particular factual situation involved in any such proceedings. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page.footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 17,500 words . 
w 
PART I 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Under competition laws the market concept is an indispensable analytical tool. It assists in 
the ascertainment of material facts , provides a framework for determinations, and allows 
judicial authorities to make succinct and informed assessments of particular practices. 
Although some concept of a "market" is inherent in all systems of competition law, a 
striking feature which is common to both the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 and the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) , is that many of their principal provisions 
relating to mergers and takeovers 1, and restrictive trade practices depend2 in one way or 
another on the identification of a market or markets in which competition has been injured 
by the impugned conduct. This is largely a result of the fact that at the time when the 
Australian and New Zealand legislation came to be drafted the concepts of market definition 
and market control had evolved to a highly developed state in other jurisdictions, 
particularly in the United States.3 
Now, however, after six years ' experience with market definition under the Commerce Act 
1986 and 18 years' under the Trade Practices Act 1974, the Australian and New Zealand 
doctrines should have their own contribution to make towards the concept of a "market" in 
antitrust analysis. It would be rewarding, therefore, to describe and analyse within thi s 
paper the principles that have so far emerged under the New Zealand and Australian 
legislative schemes, in light also of cases and writings in the major overseas antitrust 
systems, such as those of the European Common Market and the United States. As the 
process of market definition will often prove to be determinative in regard to suits or 
applications brought under the Commerce Act 1986 and the Trade Practices Act 1974, an 
examination of those principles which underly the identification of a relevant market will 
have practical as well as conceptual importance. 
It must, however, be pointed out that in contrast to the Commerce Act and the Trade 
Practices Act, there is no statutory definition of the term " market" within antitrust 
legislation in the United States or the European Common Market. The task of delineating a 
I 
2 
3 
Sec. Commerce Act 1986 ss.47. 66. ,md 67 ; Trade Practices Act 1974 ss. 50. and 94. 
Sec. Commerce Act 1986 ss. 27 . 28 . 36 m1d 36A; Trade Practices Act 1974 ss.45 . 46. 46A. 47 . 
49 and 50. 
See for example. United States v E./. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 351 US 377 ( 1956). in which 
the Supreme Court of the United States employed sophisticated theoretical concepts such as 
demand substitution and cross-elasticity of demand to determine whether different products should 
he included in the s,unc market. 
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relevant market is, however, routinely undertaken by courts within these jurisdictions in 
order to provide a medium within which market power can be assessed.4 
The following discussion of the relevant market concept must logically commence with an 
examination of the statutory definition of a market within the Commerce Act and the Trade 
Practices Act. Once the requirements and implications of those statutory provisions have 
been taken upon board, the next step in the enquiry will be to analyse the product, 
geographic space, function and time dimensions of the market concept that have been 
employed within New Zealand and Australian authorities as an aid for the determination of 
the relevant market. Consideration will also be given to the notion of a sub-market and its 
value under the Commerce Act and the Trade Practices Act in light of certain criticisms of 
the sub-market concept eminating from the United States. The discussion contained within 
this paper will serve to demonstrate the fact that the process of market delineation employed 
by New Zealand and Australian authorities is a somewhat impressionistic exercise which 
involves a large amount of subjective assessment on the part of the relevant court or 
tribunal. Therefore, by way of conclusion it will be suggested that the task of market 
definition should be approached in a pragmatic manner which necessarily takes account of 
such flexibility within the market definition process and tempers it against an increased 
emphasis upon the commercial realities of the particular factual situation involved in any 
such proceedings. 
The Economic Concept of a "Market" 
A classically defined economic market is "that area and set of products within which prices 
are linked to one another by supply or demand side arbitrage and in which those prices can 
be treated independently of goods not in the market."5 The economist Alfred Marshall 
explained this concept of a market in terms of, a collection of buyers and sellers who are 
" in such free intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to equality 
easily and quickly".6 
4 
6 
See. L.A. Sullivan . Antitrust (West Publishing Co .. St Paul [Minnesota], I 977) 41 ; 
Europ emballaxe and Co111ine,11al Can Co . In c. v E. C. Commission (1973] 12 CMLR 199. 226. 
D.T. Scheffman & P.T. Spiller. "Geographic Market Definition under the U.S. Department of 
Ju ticc Guideline", 30 J. Law & Econ. 123, 125 (1987). 
A. Marshall , Principles of Economics (9 ed .. MacMillan & Co Ltd. London, 196 l) 324. 
2 
Originally a market was a public place in a town or village where merchandise was exposed 
for sale, however, Marshall points out that such a distinction based on locality is no longer 
necessary:7 
"The traders may be spread over a whole town, or region of country, and 
yet make a market, if they are, by means of fairs, meetings, published price 
lists, the post office or otherwise, in close communication with each other." 
The element of communication is crucial, for a competitive market is essentially an 
information system. It transmits data that enables producers to adjust their operations to 
changes in consumer tastes, technology or in the availability of materials (indeed, if these 
factors were not continually changing there would be no need for economic decision-
making at all). Through the market, a firm's suppliers tell it how much of their raw 
materials they are prepared to supply at different prices, and buyers tell the firm each time 
they make a purchasing decision what products they want and what quantities they are 
prepared to take at various prices. The market gives all producers an incentive to emulate 
those who best adapt to, and make use of, change. The contest among suppliers to 
respond most effectively to changes in demand and supply conditions is the process called 
competition. 
All competition therefore presupposes the existence of a market, and all competition law is 
designed to keep the market mechanism free to do its job of informing and rewarding 
without its effectiveness being impaired by sellers who form cartels or exploit dominant 
positions which enable them to ignore these signals from the market.8 
Alfred Marshall's definition 9 relates to the geographic aspects of the market. This 
definition also assumes that a market consists of homogeneous products, as shown by the 
use of the words, "the same goods"_ lo However, for the purposes of applying 
competition law one must consider not only the geographic dimensions of the market, but 
also the product market (which includes a range of non-identical goods or services which 
are substitutable for those supplied by the parties under scrutiny), the temporal dimension 
(the time period over which the degree of substitutability is to be assessed), and the 
functional level in question (such as manufacturing or importing, wholesaling, or retailing). 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A. Marshall. Principles of Economics , above n.6. 325. 
See, M. Friedman and R. Friedman. Free 10 Choose: A Personal Statement (Harcourt Brace & 
Jovanovich, New York. 1980) 15-18. 
A. Marsha.II. Principles of Economics , above n.6. 
Above n.6. 
3 
When a market is defined in these terms, one is in effect saying that if prices were 
appreciably raised for the product within a given area, supply from outside could not be 
expected to enter quickly enough and in sufficiently large amounts to restore the old price. 
Defining the market therefore identifies those sellers who, if they all chose to act in concert 
would have effective monopoly power, at least in the short run. 11 Conversely, it identifies 
the sellers who currently are (or should be) competing among themselves and whose 
actions will thus limit one another's market power. Thus the market may be described as 
an arena for the primary demand and supply forces that determine the price of the particular 
product to which the impugned conduct under legal scrutiny relates. 12 
The Legal Concept of a "Market" 
For most persons in business there is nothing extraordinary about the process of analysing 
markets. Firms make decisions each day in the context of their appraisal of the markets in 
which they operate or propose to operate. That appraisal will more than likely be based 
upon the firm's experience and knowledge of its own pattern of trade and that of its 
competitors and also upon special investigations, perhaps involving market research. One 
could predict that business operators would be dismayed to discover that the process of 
market analysis under the Commerce Act 1986 and the Trade Practices Act 1974 may in 
fact result in the relevant market being delineated in a manner which is incompatible with 
the views of the business person. 
The broad policy aim of the Commerce Act and Part IV of the Trade Practices Act is the 
preservation and promotion of "competition." 13 However, the existence of competition in 
any given situation is itself delineated by reference to market definition, persons being 
regarded as competitors when they operate in the same market. Thus, the term market" 
should be looked upon as a construct designed to assist in the analysis of processes of 
competition, as competition does not take place in a vacuum, but in a context dubbed "the 
11 
12 
13 
As over a period of time, a position of market power will tend to be eroded as customers turn to 
other products as substitutes for the monopolised one ('cross-elasticity of demand'). and as other 
suppliers, seeing that the cartel or dominant concern is able to reap monopoly profits. enter the 
market in order to share in some of those profits and, by increasing the supply, ultimately increase 
competition and drive the price down ('cross-elasticity of supply'). See, helow n. I 84. 
See, G. deQ. Walker, "Product Market Definition In Competition Law··. 11 Fed.L.R. 387. 388 
( 1980). 
[n delivering the judgement of the Court of Appeal in True Tone Ltd v Fes1ival Records Re1ail 
Marke ling Ltd [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352, Richarson J. at 358 found that this policy of promoting ,md 
preserving competition which underpins the Act is "based on the premise that society's resources 
arc best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firm en ure maximum efficiency 
in the use of resources." 
4 
relevant market" 14. For this reason the process by which the relevant market is to be 
delineated will obviously have a considerable impact upon antitrust proceedings. In 1976 
the Trade Practices Act Review Committee (Swanson Committee) observed: 15 
" ... market definition is always of considerable importance. If the market 
is too widely defined it may be that the requisite effect upon competition 
cannot ever be shown, to the detriment of those seeking relief from a 
restrictive agreement or practice. Alternatively, if the market is too 
narrowly defined it may result in hardship to and unnecessary limitations 
upon business actions, such as inhibitions upon exploiting novelty". 
Therefore, delineation of the relevant market is not to be viewed as an end in itself. Its 
significance lies rather in the fact that it specifies the relevant universe within which a 
complete antitrust analysis should be focused. 16 Thus, the market delineation process 
provides the fust in a set of stepping-stones which enable the courts to discharge this task 
of assessing the degree of market power possessed by the impugned party in the principled 
and certain manner required by the doctrine of the rule of law. The procedures within it 
enable the court (or other trier of fact) to organise complex fact situations and classify them 
in such a way as to enable competition policy (as embodied in the Commerce Act and the 
Trade Practices Act) to be intelligently applied. 
It follows from this line of reasoning that, where a provision within the Commerce Act or 
the Trade Practices Act requires the impugned conduct of a party to be assessed in the 
context of a market, it would be logically appropriate to define the boundaries of the 
relevant market from the outset. A similar line of thought was expressed by Mr Justice 
Richardson in the New Zealand Court of Appeal's decision in Tru Tone Ltd v Festival 
Records Retail Market Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Tru Tone), where his Honour 
observed that: 17 
14 
15 
16 
17 
R. J. Ahdar (ed). Compe1i1ion Law and Policy in New Zealand (Law Book Co., Sydney. 1991) 
155-160. 
Trade Practices Act Review Committee. '"Report to the Minister for Busines · and Consumer 
Affairs" (Canberra. 1976), 4.19. Sec also. N. R. Nonnan and P. Cornwell. "Market Competition 
and Dominance: A Note on Economic Concepts Imported from Economic Analysis". in CCH 
Trade Practices Editors, Australian Trade Practices Repor1er (CCH (Australia) Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 
~2-500. 
F.M. Fisher. "Diagnosing Monopoly," 19 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 7 (1979). 
[1988) 2 NZLR 352. 358. Sec also. Telecom Corpora1io11 of New Lealand Lid v Commerce 
Commission (1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.364: "Market <lcfinition is but a first step, albeit ,Ul 
import,wt step. in the analysis of dominance detriment :uid public benefit." 
5 
" ... the identification of the relevant market is the first step towards the 
assessment of the current state of competition and of the nature and extent of 
any inhibition of competition." 
6 
PART II 
2. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "MARKET" 
The substantive provisions of the Commerce Act 1986 closely follow those of Part IV of 
the Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 (Cth), allowing for variations in form and 
procedure attributable to constitutional differences between these two nations. This is part 
of the policy connected with the ANZCERTA treaty 18 to harmonise New Zealand and 
Australian commercial legislation. The achievement of harmonisation has also been 
assisted by the attitude of the New Zealand judiciary in their interpretation of the Commerce 
Act 1986. The leading cases have shown an acceptance of the idea that the form and 
substance of the Commerce Act requires them to have regard to Australian authorities 
where relevant. 19 In the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields 
decision the President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal observed:20 
" ... Australasian uniformity and reciprocity in commercial law are goals to 
be pursued by the courts as well as the legislature." 
Therefore, in view of this it is submitted that an examination of the Australian approach to 
the definition of "market" in section 4E of the Trade Practices Act will be of great assistance 
in shedding light upon the corresponding New Zealand provision. 
18 
19 
20 
The Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERT A) came 
into force on l January 1983. The ANZCERTA treaty was subsequently reviewed between 
November 1987 and August 1988. As a result of this review, New Zealand and Australia entered 
into the " Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of Australia on Harmonisation of Business Law". This Memorandum provided that 
New Zealand and Australia should develop a program for moving towards further harmonisation of 
a range of business laws by 30 June 1990. See. T. Dellow and J. Feil, "Competition Law and 
Trans-Tasman Trade"; in R. Ahdar (ed). Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand. above n.14. 
24-30. 
See, for exrunple, Auckland Regional Authority v Mu1ual Rell/al Cars (Auckland Airpor!) Lid 
(1988) 2 NZBLC 103,04 1, 103,062. 
( 1989) 2 NZBLC 103.741 , Cooke P .. 103,747. See also. the foreword to R. J. Ahdar (ed). 
Compe1ilion Law and Policy in New Zealand. above n. 14. where the Right Honourable Sir lvor 
Richardson comments at v: "One theme running through many of the chapters is that the courts 
and tribunals of the two countries should be prepared as far as possible to recognise the progress 
that has been made towards a common market. the goal of increasing harmonisation of commercial 
statutes reflected in ANZCERT A and a shared interpretation of common statutory areas. That 
willingness to understand ,u1d apply - but not slavishly - the wealth of Australian material has hcen 
a positive feature of the approach taken hy the Commission and the courts in competition areas in 
recent years". 
7 
(I) The Australian Definition of "Market" 
Section 4E21 of the Trade Practices Act provides: 
"For the purpose of this Act, "market" means a market in Australia and, 
when used in relation to any goods or services, includes a market for those 
goods or services and other goods or services that are substitutable for, or 
otherwise competitive with; the first mentioned goods or services." 
This statutory definition embodies the concept of a market which was enunciated by the 
Australian Trade Practices Tribunal in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd 
and Defiance Holdings Ltd (hereinafter referred to as QCMA)22: 
"We take the concept of market to be a basically simple idea. A market is 
the area of close competition between firms or, putting it a little differently, 
the field of rivalry between them ... Within the bounds of a market there is 
substitution - substitution between one product and another, in response to 
changing prices. So a market is the field of actual and potential transactions 
between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, 
at least in the long run, if given a sufficient price incentive ... . Whether 
such substitution is feasible or likely depends ultimately on customer 
attitudes, technology, distance, and cost and price incentives. 
It is the possibilities of such substitution which sets the limits upon a firm's 
ability 'to give less and charge more' . Accordingly, in determining the 
outer boundaries of the market we ask a quite simple but fundamental 
question: If the firm were to 'give less and charge more' would there be, to 
put the matter colloquially, much of a reaction'?" 
In the subsequent decision of Re Tooth & Co Ltd: Re Tooheys Ltd, the Trade Practices 
Tribunal had occasion to explain in greater detail the principles which had been enunciated 
in the QCMA case:23 
21 
22 
23 
Section 4E was inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977. 
(1976) ATPR 140-012. 17,247. 
( 1979) A TPR 140-013, 18.196. 
"[C]ompetition may proceed not just through the substitution of one product 
for another in use (substitution in demand) but also through the substitution 
of one source of supply for another in production or distribution 
(substitution in supply). The market should comprehend the maximum 
range of business activities and the widest geographic area within which, if 
given a sufficient economic incentive, buyers can switch to a substantial 
extent from one source of supply to another and sellers can switch to a 
substantial extent from one production plan to another. In an economist's 
language, both cross-elasticity of demand and cross-elasticity of supply are 
relevant." 
It has been made plainly obvious by the numerous Australian authorities24 which have 
adopted the QCMA approach in interpreting the subsequently enacted definition of "market" 
in section 4E, that the requirement of substitutability is to be treated as a central 
consideration in any delineation of a relevant market. 
( 2) The Original Definition of "Market" in New Zealand 
Although the term " market" was originally defined in section 3(1) of the Commerce Act 
1986 (prior to 1 July 1990), New Zealand courts25 quickly adopted as the source of that 
statutory definition the following passage from the former Commerce Commission's 
decision in Edmonds Food Industries Ltd/W. F . Tucker & Co. Ltd (under the since 
repealed Commerce Act 1975)26 : 
24 
25 
26 
"A market has been defined as a field of actual or potential transactions 
between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, 
at least in the long run if given a sufficient price incentive. ln delineating 
the particular market in any particular case there is a value judgement which 
must be made which involves, for example, an assessment of pertinent 
See in particular. Re Tooth & Co. Ltd; Re Tooheys Ltd (1989) ~40-113, 18.196: TPC 1• 
Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd ( I 979) ATPR ~40-126, 18.356; Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd 
v f-l ecar In vestments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR ~40-327. 43,983; TPC v TNT Management 
Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR ~40-512. 46,142-46,144; Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sponsgear Ply Ltd 
( 1987) ATPR ~40-809 , 48,797-48,798; TPC v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Lid ( 1989) ATPR 
~40-932, 51 ,783. The QCMA approach was also approved (e ither express ly or impliedly) by 
Mason C.J., Wilson. Dawson and Toohey J.J..in the High Court of Australia's decision in 
Queensland Wire Indu stries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Co. Lid ( 1989) ATPR ~40-925, 
(Mason C.J. and Wilson J.) 50.008; (Dawson J.) 50,015; and (Toohey J.) 50.021. 
See, Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auck land Airport) Ltd [ 1987] 2 NZLR 
647,669; True Tone ltd v Fes1ival Records Re1ail Marke1i11i Lid (19881 2 NZLR 352, 358-359. 
Commerce Commission Decision No.84 (2 1 June 1984), para. 7. 
9 
market realities such as technology, distance, cost and price incentives; an 
assessment of the degree of substitutability of products; an appreciation of 
the fact that a market is dynamic and that potential competition is relevant; 
and an evaluation of industry viewpoints and public tastes and attitudes. 
Particularly important in this process is industry recognition (both by 
supplier and purchaser) and recognition by the consumer. Ultimately the 
judgement as to the appropriate market and its delineation by function , 
product and area - is a question of fact which must be made on the basis of 
commercial common sense in the circumstances of each case." (Emphasis 
added) 
The pragmatic nature of the Edmonds/Tucker definition appears to have impressed those 
responsible for drafting the Commerce Act 1986 for they incorporated the "fact" and 
"commercial common sense" components into the statutory definition of market contained 
in s.3( 1) of the 1986 Act as originally enacted. That provision read: 
"'Market', means a market for goods and services within New Zealand that 
may be distinguished as a matter of fact and commercial common sense." 
The reference to "fact and commercial common sense" within this definition associated with 
the lack of any requirement of substitutability has led to some rather confusing judicial 
pronouncements regarding this provision. Initially it appeared that the requirements of 
"commercial common sense" within section 3(1) and the notion of substitutability included 
within the Australian provision27 would be compatible concepts. In the New Zealand 
High Court decision of Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland 
Airport) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as ARA) Mr Justice Barker commented:28 
27 
28 
"Counsel submitted that the reference to ' fact and commercial common 
sense ' in the New Zealand definition meant that, in New Zealand, the Court 
should give more weight to the views of businessmen in the market place 
when defining the relevant boundaries of the market. In my view that 
submission is simplistic; the reference in the Act to commercial common 
sense (as distinct from any other kind of common sense) as the yardstick by 
which to determine a market is another and more straight forward way of 
articulating the Australian definition. 
Trade Practices Act 1974, s.4E. 
[1987] 2 NZLR 647. 669 . 
10 
The matters in the Australian definition must enter the Court's assessment of 
'fact and commercial common sense'. The assessment must be made from 
a consideration of the composition of and forces in the market. The 
perceptions of the participants can only be part of the necessary information 
available. 
I should have been sorry to have reached an opposite conclusion and to 
have held the Australian definition inappropriate." 
A somewhat different approach is evident in the New Zealand Court of Appeal's judgement 
in Tru Tone. In delivering the judgement of the Court, Richardson J. commented:29 
"In focusing in the definition in s.3( 1) on distinguishability as a matter of 
fact and commercial common sense the legislation has carefully avoided 
giving prominence to any particular criterion. In particular, the test is not 
substitutability as such, although that will ordinarily be an important 
consideration." 
However, in two subsequent decisions of the New Zealand High Court the differences 
between the Australian and New Zealand statutory formulation were accorded greater 
emphasis. In New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields, Holland J. 
(after citing Richardson J. 's comments in Tru Tone) observed:30 
"The definition of 'market' is not the same as that in the Trade Practices Act 
in Australia and this renders some of the observations in Australian cases to 
be of little assistance." 
While Tipping J. in the New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd 
decision also noted the differences between the two definitions and cautioned against giving 
too much weight to substitutability:3 1 
29 
30 
3 I 
"While I acknowledge that questions of substitutability are certainly relevant 
in delineating a market in New Zealand, they are by no means the be all and 
[ I 988] 2 NZLR 352, 359. 
(1989) 2 NZBLC ~99-154, 103. 577. 
[ 1990] I NZLR 731. 746. 
11 
end all of the exercise and care must be taken not to give too much weight to 
that or any other aspect. It is a matter of weighing all the relevant 
considerations and then, against our statutory definition, distinguishing the 
relevant market as a matter of fact and commercial common sense. Matters 
pertaining to economics and economic theory are relevant but must be kept 
in perspective in the light of the direction to the Courts inherent in the 
definition." 
Thus, section 3(1) of the Commerce Act could be seen as providing a somewhat 
unsatisfactory definition of "market" as it created a degree of uncertainty as to whether this 
formulation was intended to displace the economic approach contained within s.4E of the 
Trade Practices Act. This state of affairs was a hindrance to the move towards 
harmonisation of New Zealand and Australian business law. 
( 3) The Current Definition of "Market" in New Zealand 
In 1988 and 1989 the New Zealand government conducted a review of the Commerce Act 
l 98632 to examine the substantive differences between the Australian and New Zealand 
legislation. As a result of this review it was decided that the definition of market contained 
in s.3( 1) should be amended to incorporate the concept of "substitutability" and thus more 
closely resemble the Australian formulation. 33 The new defiQition of "market" was 
introduced by section 3( 1 A) of the Commerce Amendment Act 1990, which reads: 
32 
33 
"Every reference in this Act ... to the term 'market' is a reference to a 
market in New Zealand for goods· or services as well as other goods or 
services that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are 
substitutable for them." 
Department of Trade and Industry, "Review of the Commerce Act 1986: A Discussion Paper" 
(Wellington. 1988). Sec also, Ministry of Commerce. ·'Review of the Commerce Act I 986: 
Reports and Decisions" (Wellington, 1989). 
See, Ministry of Commerce. "Review of the Commerce Act 1986: Reports ;uid Decisions:· above 
n.32. where it was observed at para 3.2: "In a number of cases under the Commerce Act substantial 
references to the leading Australian cases concerned with market definition have been included. 
However. in a more recent judgement the judge noted the differences between New Zealand ,Uld 
Australia and commented that this rendered the Australi.ui observations ·of liule value.' We are 
concerned that following this case the means of defining a market under the Commerce Act and the 
Trade Practices Act might diverge. For this reason we propose that a new definition more closely 
resembling that in the Trade Practices Act he adopted." 
12 
The first occasion34 on which the New Zealand High Court has discussed the implications 
of this amendment, was in the decision of Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v 
Commerce Commission (hereinafter referred to as Telecom)35 . The High Court, 
(comprising of Greig, J., Mr W. G. Shaw and Professor M. Brunt) found that s.3(1A) did 
not give rise to any new change in focus for the process of market definition under the 
Commerce Act. On this point, the Court commented:36 
"The practical effect of the revised wording appears to be no more than to 
make the relevance of economic substitutability explicit. It thus resolves 
some doubts that had previously been expressed, and confirms the 
relevance of the main line of New Zealand decisions (such as Auckland 
Regional Authority and Tru Tone at first instance and on appeal) and of 
Australian authorities (such as QCMA, Tooth and Tooheys, Queensland 
Wire). The retention of the reference to "commercial common sense", a 
term that first appeared in Edmonds Food Industries Ltd/W.F. Tucker & 
Co. Ltd ... affums the traditional New Zealand emphasis upon the need for 
a commercially realistic factual base. We see no source of conflict or 
tension in the juxtaposition of the two elements, substitutability and 
commercial common sense, in this formulation. Compare Barker, J. in 
Auckland Regional Authority at NZBLC p. 103,061; NZLR 669-670." 
The Court then noted that in both the Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions it has been 
said, in effect, that a mechanical reliance upon substitution criteria in a contextual vacuum is 
not sufficient. ln endorsing the view that "market" is an instrumental concept, the Court 
observed:37 
34 
35 
36 
37 
"Hence the boundaries should be drawn by reference to the conduct at 
issue, the terms of the relevant section or sections, and the policy of the 
statute. Some judgement is required, bearing in mind that 'market' is an 
instrumental concept designed to clarify the sources and potential effects of 
market power that may be possessed by an enterprise. ln the words of 
As on earlier occasions the New Zealand High Court had not discussed this matter fully. See. 
McD011uld Motors Ltd v Christchurch !11temutio11ul Airport Ltd. Unreported, 6 December 199 l. 
High Court, Christchurch Registry, CP 413/91, 12; lloyts Corporutio11 /foldings Operntions 
(NZ) Ltd v Commerce Commission. Unreported. 17 December 1991. High Court. Auckland 
Registry, CL 44/91, 11. 
( 1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.360. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.360. 
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Mason C.J. and Wilson J. in Queensland Wire at ATPR p.50,008; CLR 
p.187: 'Defining the market and evaluating the degree of power in that 
market are part of the same process' ... " 
Therefore, it appears that the Australian and New Zealand definitions of "market" are 
compatible formulations although differing in emphasis due to the retention of the "fact and 
commercial common sense" element within the amended New Zealand provision. The 
decision of the New Zealand legislature to retain this element of the statutory definition may 
perhaps be an implied recognition of the notion that, important as they are, the concepts of 
substitutability of supply and demand will not provide a complete solution to the task of 
defining the relevant market. It is impossible to state the precise level of cross-elasticity of 
supply and cross-elasticity of demand required to include a product or service in a particular 
market or exclude it. 38 The adjudicator is thereby given a certain degree of flexibility in 
determining the boundaries of the market. It seems, therefore, quite possible that the New 
Zealand Legislature in enacting s.3(1A) may have intended that any such flexibility 
provided by the notion of "substitutability" should be tempered against the requirement of 
"commercial common sense". Thus, it is submitted that the boundaries of the relevant 
market should reflect the commercial realities of the particular industry in question as well 
as the theoretical substitution possibilities.39 It may be safely assumed that those parties 
involved in any particular case would wish the matters in dispute to be judged on the 
particular facts as they present them, rather than theoretical rules of economics that are 
designed to achieve, what has been suggested is an illusory certainty.40 
38 
39 
40 
Sec. Queensland Wire lndusrries Pry Lrd v Broken I/ill Propriewry Co . Lrd ( 1989) ATPR ~40-
925. Dawson J .. 50.015: "Important as they arc. ela.sticities and the notion of substitution provide 
no complete solution to the definition of a market. A question of degree is involved - at what 
point do different goods become closely enough linked in supply or demand to he included in the 
one market - which precludes any dogmatic answer. See. Times-Picuyune 1· United Stutes 345 US 
594 ( 1953) at p. 612. n. 31. The process is an inexact one as may he illustrated hy reference to 
the concept of a sub-market which h,L<; heen employed from time to time." 
See, e.g., True Tone Lrd .. v Festival Records R etail Murkering Lrd. [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352. 360: 
where the New Zealand High Court rejected the plaintiffs submission that each album on the charts 
constituted a separate and unique market. on the grounds that '·as a mailer of fact ,Uld commercial 
common sense" no distributor or retailer could run a business on the basis that the market is 
confined to just one unique album. 
See. Trade Practices Act Review Committee. "Report to the Minister for Business ,Uld Consumer 
Affairs". above n.15, 4.21. 
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PART III 
3. DIMENSIONS OF THE "MARKET" 
As an aid for the determination of the relevant market, the courts and tribunals in Australia 
and New Zealand have traditionally adopted the approach of considering three different 
dimensions of the market concept separately - the product dimension, the functional level 
and the geographic dimension.41 However, if a thorough analysis of the relevant market 
is to be achieved then the appropriate time period for assessing the degree of substitutability 
must also be considered. For as Professor Maureen Brunt explains:42 
"A market has product, space, function and time dimensions. Between 
what set of products can customers and suppliers switch? Within what 
geographic space? Is the focus to be on the selling function, and how 
many levels or stages of production and distribution is it appropriate to 
distinguish in order to assess the scope for substitution through trade? 
Finally, how much time is needed for customers and suppliers to make their 
adjustments in response to economic incentives? " 
These four dimensions to the market construct which have been identified by Professor 
Brunt merit individual analysis within this paper. 
( 1) THE PRODUCT MARKET 
The fust specific set of questions the analyst must ask when delineating the relevant market 
relate to the range of different 'products' (i.e., goods or services43) which should properly 
be included within the same market as the product in issue. Like their overseas 
counterparts, courts and tribunals in Australia have recognised substitutability as a central 
criterion for determining the width of the relevant market. As we have seen, the 
introduction of the revised definition of market in s. 3(1 A) of the Commerce Amendment 
41 
42 
43 
Y. van Roy , Guidebook 10 New Zealand Compe1i1ion La ws (2 ed .. CCH (NZ) Ltd. Auckland. 
I 991) 61. See also. True Tone Ltd v Fes1ival Records Retail Marketinx Ltd [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352; 
In re Tooth & Co. Ltd; In re Tooheys Ltd (1979) ATPR ~40-113 . 
Professor M. Brunt, ... Market Definition· Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practice 
Litigation" ; in R. J. Ahdar (ed). Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand. above n. 14. 130. 
Commerce Act 1986 s.3( 1 A): "Every reference in this Act ... to the 'market' is a reference to a 
market in New Zealand for xoods or sen1ices ..... (Emphasis added) 
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Act 1990 has resolved any doubts as to the appropriateness of this approach in the New 
Zealand context.44 
The product market is probably the most important dimension, for the outcome of a case 
will often depend on how willing the particular court or tribunal is to accept a wider range 
of goods or services as credible substitutes for the product in question.45 The wider the 
range accepted as substitutes, the larger the relevant market, and the less likely the persons 
responsible for the conduct at issue will be considered to " substantially lessen 
competition"46 or be in a "dominant position" .47 
(a) The Concept of Substitution 
Although a detailed economic analysis is outside the scope of this paper, some 
understanding of the economic concept of ' substitution ' is essential since it is expressly 
referred to in the statutory definition of market in s.3( I A) of the Commerce Act and s.4E of 
the Trade Practices Act. The notion of substitutability leads to a consideration of the 
economic principles of 'cross-elasticity of demand ' and 'cross-elasticity of supply ' . In the 
ARA decision Barker, J. observed:48 
"The Tooth case makes it clear that one must take the goods or services 
relevant to the enquiry and identify the area of close rivalry or competition, 
seeking the boundaries by examination of the ready availability or 
interchangeability of substitute services in response to economic incentives 
[in] demand or supply; in other words to use 'economists speak ' one must 
identify cross-elasticity of demand and cross-elasticity of supply." 
( i) "Demand Substitution" and "Cross-Elasticity of Demand" 
An important consideration in determining the product market is the notion of 'demand 
substitution ', that is the extent to which buyers can switch their demand from one product 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Ahove n.33 and n.36. 
See, Y . van Roy. ahove n.4 L 6 1. 
Commerce Act 1986 ss. 27. 28 and 30. 
Commerce Act 1986 ss. 36 and 36A. 
(19871 2 NZLR 647. 670-671. See al so. Q11ee11slu11d Wire lndus1ries Ptv Ltd 1· Broken Ifill Ptv 
Co . Ltd ( 1989) ATPR ~40-925. Dawson. J .. 50.01 4: "The suhstit~tion test involves the 
ascertainment or cross-elasticity or supply and cross-elasticity or <.lemm1<.1. that is to say. the extent 
to which the supply or dem;u,d for a product responds to a ch:u,ge in the price of another product. 
Cross-elasticities of supply mid de1mU1d reveal the degree Lo which one product may he suhstituted 
for ,U1other. ,U1 important consideration in any definition of market.·· 
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to another in order to satisfy their needs.49 'Cross-elasticity of demand is a concept which 
is used to evaluate the degree of demand substitutability between two products. This 
concept measures the extent to which the relative demand for two products is sensitive to 
changes in the price of each, relative to the other. In the New Zealand High Court's 
decision in the Telecom case this construct was phrased in terms of one fundamental 
question, which is referred to as "the price evaluation test":50 
When a particular product undergoes a notional small increase in price, will 
the potential purchasers of that product switch their demand to an alternative 
product? 
Example; If the manufacturer of 'Surf' laundry powder increases the price 
of its product, would consumers switch their demand to 'Dynamo' laundry 
liquid? 
lf a rise in the price of one product is followed by an increase in the demand for another 
product (the price of which is held constant), there may be positive cross-elasticity of 
demand between the two products. If the degree of positive cross-elasticity is sufficiently 
high, the two products may be considered as competing in the same market. Conversely, 
a low degree of cross-elasticity of demand indicates that the products are independent of 
each other and are not to be included in the same market. 
However, in many situations pricing levels will not be the sole determinant of 'demand 
substitution'. ln considering whether products have a sufficiently high degree of 
substitutability other factors such as physical characteristics of the products and consumer 
preferences may also be relevant in determining whether potential purchasers of a product 
will switch their demand to an alternative product in response to a price increase.51 
49 
50 
5 I 
See, /11 re Tooth & Co Ltd; /11 re Tooheys Ltd (1979) ATPR ~40-113. 18,196. 
In Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission ( 1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-
239, it was observed by Greig J .. Mr W.G. Shaw and Professor M. Brunt al 102.362 that .. [L]he 
mental test that prompts a summary evaluation of the evidence is to ask how buyers and sellers 
would likely react Lo a notional small percentage increase in price of the products of interest ... (the 
'price evaluation test')." 
See. S. G. Corones, Competition Law and Policy in Australia (Law Book Co .. Sydney. 1990) 44. 
This is also supported by the New Zealand High Court's findings in True Tone lid v Festival 
Records Retail Marke1ing Ltd [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352, 360 that when a recorded album is performing 
well in the 'charts' a sizeable percentage of popular purchasers will want that particular album and 
will not be prepared to substitute it for another. 
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(ii) The Requisite Level of Positive "Cross-Elasticity of Demand" 
The dictionary definition of the verb 'substitute' is to put one thing in the place of 
another. 52 However, the inclusion of the phrase "as a matter of fact and commercial 
common sense" within s.3( 1 A) of the Commerce Act, and the words "or otherwise 
competitive with" in s.4E of the Trade Practices Act indicate that it was not the intention of 
the New Zealand or Australian legislature that the term 'substitutable' should require the 
alternative product to be virtually identical (e.g., two different brands of long grain rice) to 
the product in issue. 
Nevertheless, a certain degree or level of positive 'cross-elasticity of demand' between the 
two products will be required before they can be said to be substitutable and included 
within the same market.53 Otherwise, the resulting delineation of the relevant market may 
be so wide as to greatly understate the market power of a firm, because in one sense all 
products are substitutes for one another. For as Edward Chamberlin explains:54 
" ... the only perfect monopoly conceivable would be one embracing the 
supply of everything, since all things are more or less imperfect substitutes 
for each other." 
It is interesting to note that in Australia the SwaQson Committee's Report of 1976 it was 
recommended at para. 4.22, "that the Act should require that, in the determination of a 
'market' for particular purposes, regard shall be had to substitute products being products 
which have a reasonable interchangeability of use and which have a high cross-elasticity of 
demand, i.e. where a small decrease in the price of a particular product would cause a 
significant quantum of demand for a similar product to switch to the product in 
question."55 However, it is apparent from the subsequent insertion of section 4E by the 
52 
53 
54 
55 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3 ed .. Oxford University Press. London. 1950) vol. II. 
2064. 
A perfect substitute would have infinite cross-elasticity of demand (i.e. an increase in the price of 
one item would result in the other item substituting itself totally for the first). On the other hand. 
zero cross-elasticity of demand suggests that the items are independent of each other (i.e. the price 
of one has no bearing on the quantity sold of tJ1e other). 
E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-Orientation of the Theory of 
Value (8 ed .. Harvard University Press. Cambridge [Massachusetts], 1962) 65. 
Trade Practices Act Review Comminee. above n.15. 4.22: "There is however, one aspect of the 
definition of 'market' about which we consider the Act should give useful legislative guidance: 
namely, in relation to product substitution. The Committee therefore recommends that the Act 
should require that. in the determination of a ·market' for particular purposes. regard shall be had to 
substitute products. being products which have a reasonable interchangeability of use mid which 
have hixh cross-elasticity of demand. i.e .. where a small decrease in the price of a particular product 
would cause a significant quantum of dem,uid for a similar product to switch to the product in 
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Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 that this suggestion was not accepted by the 
Australian Federal Parliament. The reason for this may lie in the notion that such a 
statutory requirement poses a danger as courts may become unduly channelled into this one 
line of enquiry, at the expense of other considerations which may be equally illuminating 
for market delineation purposes (e.g., cross-elasticity of supply). 
It is submitted that under s.3( 1 A) of the Commerce Act and s.4E of the Trade Practices Act 
the degree of substitutability required before a competing product or service is included in 
the market under investigation is ultimately a matter for the courts to decide on the facts of 
each case. It is a matter concerning which the evidence of those operating in the market 
will be highly relevant. The court should be presented with expert testimony from 
marketing personnel on the question of demand substitutability, and then make its own 
subjective assessment as to the boundaries of the product market on the basis of this 
evidence. Economic theory is useful to explain how markets work but is less useful on 
market definition. It can not prescribe the exact degree or level of substitutability required 
to include a product in a market for the purposes of giving practical content to sections 
3( 1 A) and 4E. It is not possible to state the precise level of cross-elasticity of demand or 
cross-elasticity of supply that is required to include a product in a particular market or to 
exclude it. This is a matter for the court's subjective assessment 
"Reasonable Interchangeability" 
The classic case concerning demand side substitutability is United States v. E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co 56 (commonly referred to by commentators as the Cellophane case) in 
which the United States Supreme Court adopted 'cross-elasticity of demand' and 
"reasonable interchangeability" of use as product market definition tests. At issue in this 
case was the question of whether the relevant product market was cellophane (in which 75 
percent of all sales in the United States were from the defendant's production (i.e. du 
Pont)) or flexible packaging materials (in which cellophane constituted less than 20 percent 
of the sales). To make this determination the Supreme Court looked to the existence of 
substitutability in demand between cellophane and other flexible packaging materials. The 
Court reasoned that a high level of cross-elasticity of demand would indicate that the 
products are to be included in the same product market. 57 ln determining what was to be 
56 
57 
question." (Emphasis added) See also. Queensland Wire lndusrries Lrd v. Broken Ifill Pty Co. 
Lrd ( I 989) ATPR ~40-925. where Toohey J. mentions al p. 50,021 this recommendation b.y the 
Swanson Committee. 
351 U.S. 377 ( 1956). 
351 U.S. 377. 400 (1956): "If a slight decrease in the price of cellophm1e causes a considerable 
number of customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to celloph,me. it would be ,U1 indication 
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considered as a high level of cross-elasticity of demand the Court formulated the following 
test: 58 
"[a] market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability 
for the purposes for which they are produced - price, use and qualities 
considered." (Emphasis added) 
In applying this test to the facts of the case, the majority of the court found that a very 
considerable degree of functional interchangeability existed between cellophane and other 
flexible wrapping materials. On this point the majority emphasised that sales of cellophane 
(for several different uses) were price sensitive, i.e., in response to price and quality 
changes, many customers switched from cellophane to other flexible wrapping materials.59 
The Court therefore concluded that the product market in question was not the market for 
cellophane only but for all flexible wrapping materials. 60 
However, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the minority, argued that the relevant product 
market in this case was cellophane. His Honour pointed to the different physical 
components of the products and, more importantly, to the higher price of cellophane. 
Warren C. J. noted cellophane's "unique combination of qualities lacking among less 
expensive materials in varying degrees"61 and continued62: 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
"If the conduct of buyers indicated that glassine, waxed and sulphite papers 
and aluminium foil were actually 'the selfsame products' as cellophane, the 
qualitative differences demonstrated by the comparison of physical 
properties ... would not be conclusive. But the record provides convincing 
proof that businessmen did not so regard these products ... We cannot 
believe that buyers, practical businessmen, would have brought cellophane 
in increasing amounts over a quarter of a century if close substitutes were 
available at from one-seventh to one half cellophane's price. That they did 
so is testimony to cellophane's distinctiveness." 
that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them: that the products compete in the srune 
market. 
351 U.S. 377. 404 (1956). 
351 U.S. 377,400 (1956). 
351 U.S. 377,400 (1956). 
35 1 U.S. 377. 415 (1956). 
351 U.S. 377. 416-417 (1956). 
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The Chief Justice also challenged the majority's conclusion that there was great price 
sensitivity to sales of cellophane, by criticising their failure to take account of the conduct 
of other suppliers. Warren C. J. noted at 417 :63 
"Finding 587 states that Sylvania, the only other cellophane producer, 
absolutely and immediately followed every du Pont price change, even 
dating back its price list to the effective date of du Pont' s change. 
Producers of glassine and waxed paper, on the other hand, displayed 
apparent indifference to du Pont's repeated and substantial price cuts ... 
[F]rom 1924 to 1932 du Pont dropped the price of plain cellophane 84%, 
while the price of glassine remained constant ... If 'shifts of business' due 
to 'price sensitivity' had been substantial, glassine and waxed paper 
producers would have been compelled by market forces to meet du Pont' s 
price challenge just as Sylvania was." 
Many other commentators64 have subsequently agreed with the minority's view that 
cellophane should have been grouped into a separate product market from other flexible 
wrapping products, so that du Pont could be said to have wielded monopoly power in the 
cellophane product market. However, despite such criticism of the manner in which the 
majority applied this product market definition test ("reasonable interchangeability" based 
on 'cross-elasticity of demand') to the facts of the Cellophane case, it still remains the basic 
test for market delineation purposes in the United States65 and the European Economic 
Community. 66 
Legal commentators have subsequently pointed out that the majority of the Court made a 
logical error in applying the reasonable interchangeability test. This has become known as 
the "Cellophane trap." The following criticism of the majority's reasoning by Professors 
Posner and Easterbrook exposes the nature of this error: 67 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
351 U.S. 377. 417 (1956). 
See. e.g., R. Pitofsky. "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust". 90 
Colum. L. R. 1805, 1814 (1990); K.G. Elzinga. "Defining Geographic Market Boundaries". 26 
Antitrust Bull. 739. 744 ( 198 l ); D.F. Turner. "Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane case". 70 
Harv. L. Rev. 281. 308-310 (1956); G.C. Schaerr. "The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice 
Department 's Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers", 94 Yale L. J. 670, 676-677 ( 1985). 
See. Brown Shoe Co v United Stares 370 U.S. 294. 325 (1962); Telex Corp. v IBM Corp., 510 
F 2d 894, 917-918 (10th Cir. 1975). 
See, L'Oreal v De Nieuwe AMCK (1980) 8 ECR 3775. 3793. 
R.A. Posner and F.H Easterbrook. Antirrust: Cases, Economic Nores and Or her Materials (2 ed .. 
West Publishing Co., St Paul [Minnesota] .1981) 362. 
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"To include products that were good substitutes for cellophane at the price at 
which cellophane was being sold by its sole producer begged the question 
whether the producer had a monopoly. If he had a monopoly and was 
charging the monopoly price, that would make substitutes attractive which 
at a competitive price would be considered grossly inferior substitutes. In 
fact it seems almost certain that the cross-elasticity of demand between 
cellophane and other flexible packaging materials for many important uses 
would have been very low had cellophane been sold at a price substantially 
nearer its cost." 
Thus, in order to avoid the "Cellophane trap," the court or tribunal should ideally examine 
substitution by reference to competitive prices rather than the prevailing price68, although 
admittedly this may not always be administratively practical. Awareness of this trap , 
however, should alert the relevant adjudicators to an analytical snare they might otherwise 
overlook. 
"Closely Substitutable" 
Australian commentators69 have argued that the term "substitutable" in section 4E of the 
Trade Practices Act must be taken to mean ' closely substitutable' in terms of both demand 
and supply. In practice the Trade Practices Tribunal has explicitly and consistently defined 
the product market in terms of "close substitutes," rather than using the " reasonable 
interchangeability" test from the Cellophane case. 70 The question of close substitutability 
as against reasonable interchangeability has yet to be argued before the Federal Court of 
Australia, however, the approach so far taken by the Federal Court would suggest that it 
has implicitly adopted the Tribunal's position.71 As a matter of speculation it may be 
suggested that the requirement of "reasonable interchangeability" is a wider test than that of 
"close substitutability," as on its face the word 'close' would appear to imply a higher level 
of cross-elasticity of demand than the word 'reasonable'.72 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
J .H. Farrar and A. Borrowdale, Bullerworths Comm ercia l Law in New Zealand (2 ed .. 
Bullerworlhs, Wellington , 1992) 668. 
S. G. Corones. above n.51, 54; G. dcQ. Walker, above n. 12, 399-400. 
In re Tooth & Co Ltd; In re Tooheys Ltd (1979) ATPR 140-01 3, 18.196; Re Howard Smith 
Indu stries Pty Ltd (1977) ATPR 1 40-023. 17.336; Q.C.M.A. ( 1976) ATPR 140-012. 17.247. 
J.D. Heydon, Trade Praclices Law (Law Book Co.(Australia) Ltd. , Sydney, 1992) vol.L 1603-
1604. 
Assuming of course thal it would be correct to treat the words 'substitutability' and 
'interchangeability' as being synonymous. 
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The New Zealand courts have followed this same approach, of delineating the relevant 
product market by focusing upon 'close substitutes' in terms of both demand and supply.73 
This is illustrated in the following obiter statement by Henry J. and R. G. Blunt Esq., 
regarding the supply of products that are substitutable for cinema viewing, in the recent 
New Zealand High Court decision of Hoyts Corporation Holdings Ltd v Commerce 
Commission 74: 
"The error in interpreting the impact of such activities as indicating the 
parameters of the market arises from a failure to pay sufficient regard to the 
need for the substitute product, if it is to form part of the relevant market, to 
be one which in terms of commercial reality is used in place of the other 
rather than simply being an alternative. The term "close substitute" was 
used by the Commission and by both counsel in their submissions, and 
although that qualification is not expressed in the statutory formulation it 
would seem to capture its intent." 
(iii) "Supply Substitution" and "Cross-Elasticity of Supply" 
In setting the limits of the product market the emphasis has historically been placed upon 
'demand side' considerations, but more recently the 'supply side' has come to be regarded 
as significant. 75 Courts and antitrust authorities in a number of jurisdictions are_ 
increasingly acknowledging the role of supply substitution in the market definition process. 
The notion of supply substitutability describes the ability of alternative suppliers to provide 
a substitutable product within the relevant market so as to limit the market power of the 
impugned firm. 
In most cases an evaluation of the boundaries of the product market will focus primarily on 
firms that currently produce and sell a relevant substitute. However, in certain 
circumstances it may be necessary to include additional firms within that market due to the 
fact that the same production and distribution facilities can sometimes be used to produce 
and sell two or more different types of goods and services. "Production substitution" 
refers to the shift by a firm in the use of its machinery or facilities from producing and 
73 
74 
75 
See, Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Ret1tal Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 
647, 669; Tru e Ton e Ltd v Festival Records Marketing Ltd [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358-359; 
Telecom Corporatiot1 of New Zealat1d Ltd v Commerce Commission ( 1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 
I 02,360-102,361. 
Above n. 34, 14. 
Queensland Wire lndusrries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co . Ltd (1989) ATPR ~40-925, Dawson J., 
50,014. 
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selling one product to producing and selling another. Thus, a supplier of product (A), 
may be included in an examination of the relevant market for product (B) if that supplier 
can use its production facilities to make a product that is substitutable for product (B) (e.g., 
product (B2)). This may be so despite the fact that the consumer would not consider 
product (A) and product (B) to be substitutable. If therefore, suppliers of fencing wire 
can, with only minor adjustments to their machinery or facilities, tum out the light steel rod 
which is used in making concrete reinforcing mesh, then those suppliers of fencing wire 
may be considered as potential new entrants to the reinforcing mesh product market. 76 
Thus, where for example, a 5 per cent rise in the price of a particular product would cause a 
number of potential competitors to switch to the production and supply of a substitutable 
product, then this high level of cross-elasticity of supply would indicate that one must take 
into account not only current competitors but also these potential competitors when 
determining the relevant market. The basic rationale behind this approach of considering 
potential competitors in the process of market delineation is explained by Professor F. M. 
Scherer 77: 
"Groups of firms making completely non-substitutable products may 
nevertheless be meaningful competitors if they employ essentially similar 
skills and equipment and if they can quickly move into each other's product 
lines should the profit lure beckon." 
The concept of 'cross-elasticity of supply' therefore measures the response of incumbent 
competitors and potential competitors to the conduct of an impugned firm which raises the 
price of its product. 
Example; If the manufacturer of 'Surf' laundry powder increases the price 
of its product, would the manufacturers of 'Dynamo' laundry liquid 
respond by increasing their supply? Would the manufacturers of 'Sunlight' 
dishwashing detergent switch to the production of laundry power or liquid? 
It is likely that the most significant source of cross-elasticity of supply will be from 
incumbent suppliers who desire a larger market share and possess the capacity to increase 
their level of supply within a short period of time. Whereas potential competitors are likely 
76 
77 
See. G. dcQ Walker, ahovc n. 12. 405 . 
F.M. Scherer. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Pe1forman ce (2 ed. Rand McNally 
College Puhlishing Co .. Chicago. 1980) 60. 
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to provide a lower degree of cross-elasticity of supply because of the financial cost and time 
delays which are usually involved in switching-over production facilities. 
The Australian Trade Practices Tribunal has consistently acknowledged the relevance of 
cross-elasticity of supply in the process of evaluating the relevant market. In Re Howard 
Smith Industries Pty Ltd the Tribunal observed:78 
"[A]n important consideration in identifying a market is the ease of 
substitution by suppliers as well as by buyers. In other words, can 
suppliers readily substitute one type or quality of product or service for 
another or can they vary the quantities supplied at different locations if there 
are differences in the prices which they obtain at those locations?" 
The High Court of Australia confirmed the importance of both demand and supply 
substitutability in the Queensland Wine Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd 
decision.79 This is demonstrated within the judgement of Toohey, J., who after referring 
to s.4E and the test of interchangeability of products on the demand side (i.e., the 
Cellophane test80), commented at p. 50,02 l :81 
"[I]n delineating the scope of the product market demand substitutability has 
often been emphasised at the expense of supply substitutability. But this 
does not mean that supply substitutability is irrelevant to the task of market 
definition: see Europemballage and Continental Can Co Inc v E. C. 
Commission [1973] 12 CMLR 199. Rather, the definition of the relevant 
market requires a consideration of substitutability both on the demand and 
on the supply side." 
The relevance of supply side substitution under the statutory definition of market in s.3(1 A) 
of the Commerce Act has recently been reaffirmed by the New Zealand High Court in the 
78 
79 
80 
81 
(1977) ATPR ~40-023 , 17,336. 
(1989) A TPR ~40-925. 
Above n. 57. 
A similar observation was made by Dawson J. in the Queensland Wire case at ( 1989) ATPR ~40-
925, 50.014: "In setting the limits of a market the ... basic test involves the ascertainment of 
both supply and demand. that is to say. the extent to which the supply of or the demand for a 
particular product responds to chm1ge in the price of ,mother product. Cross-elasticities of supply 
and demand reveal the degree to which one product may he substituted for another. an important 
consideration in any definition of a market." 
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Telecom decision.82 Greig, J., Mr W. G. Shaw and Professor M. Brunt observed at p. 
l 02,362 of the judgement: 
" ... competition may proceed both through substitution in demand and 
substitution in supply in response to changing prices or, more 
comprehensively, the changing price-product-service packages offered, as 
was first recognised in this Court by Barker, J., in Auckland Regional 
Authority ... The mental test that prompts a summary evaluation of the 
evidence is to ask how buyers and sellers would likely react to a notional 
small percentage increase in price of the products of interest, e.g. the 
standard telephone service, the cellular service (the 'price evaluation test')." 
(iv) "Supply Substitution" as Distinct from "New Entry" 
The notion of supply substitution by a potential competitor is closely related to the concept 
of 'new entry' by a firm wishing to compete in a particular market as both constructs 
involve a switch-over of production facilities so as to enable entry into the market. The 
main distinction between these two concepts would appear to lie in the firm's relative ease 
of entry into a market in terms of time and adjustment of production facilities. 83 Professor 
Scherer addresses the problem as follows: 84 
"How quickly must firms be able to shift over between products to be 
classified in the same industry? Given a long enough period and sufficient 
investment, shifts in production activity more accurately described as 'new 
entry' than as 'substitution' can take place. A distinction between 
substitutability in production and ease of entry (i.e., where barriers to entry 
are minimal) must be drawn. At the risk of being somewhat arbitrary we 
should probably draw the line to include as substitutes on the production 
side only existing capacity that can be shifted in the short run, i.e., without 
significant new investment in plant, equipment and worker training." 
This issue discussed by Scherer has also been commented upon by the New Zealand High 
Court in the Telecom decision. 85 On 17 October 1990, the Commerce Commission86 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 
See, F. M. Scherer, above n.77, 60-61. 
F. M. Scherer. above n.77. 60-61. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 
Decision No. 254 of the Commerce Commission. 17 October 1990. 
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declined to give a clearance or grant an authorisation for, Telecom's acquisition of the 
management rights for the radio frequency spectrum AMPS-A. 87. The Commission found 
that Telecom's ownership and control of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
gave it a dominant position in both the voice telephony (fixed) market and the voice 
telephone (mobile) market. It was considered that the acquisition of AMPS-A by Telecom 
would strengthen its position in the mobile market. On appeal to the New Zealand High 
Court, counsel for Telecom submitted, inter alia, that the Commission failed to take a long-
run approach, leading it to focus only on mobile telephone technology actually operating in 
the New Zealand commercial market at the time of the decision rather than including the 
numerous alternative technologies which were either currently available or are on a 
development path. Counsel submitted that if the purpose of the exercise was to assess the 
market power of an incumbent, one should extend the market boundaries on the supply 
side to include both substitution in production and entirely new entry in order that all 
relevant constraints be considered. The High Court, however, rejected the validity of this 
approach on the basis that:88 
"[I]n accordance with standard procedure in litigation of this type, the time-
frame for market definition is not identical with the time-frame for assessing 
market constraints when account is taken of the potential for new entry. 
The phrase in common use 'to enter a market' contemplates that market 
boundaries are placed about buyers and sellers already in existence. We 
include within the market those sources of supply that come about from 
deploying existing production and distribution capacity but stop short of 
including supplies arising from entirely new entry. Thus 'the long run' in 
market definition does not refer to any particular length of calendar time but 
to the operational time required for organising and implementing a 
redeployment of existing capacity in response to profit incentives." 
However, the High Court did accept that the Commerce Commission m its general 
orientation and its approach to market definition adopted too short a time perspective.89 . 
Hence while endorsing the Commission's treatment of the mobile telephone service as a 
product market distinct from the fixed telephone service, (the high price of the cellular 
service was decisive in making this distinction)90, the Court was critical of the Commission 
87 
88 
89 
90 
AMP is an abbreviation of the phrase · Adv,mced Mobile Phone System.· 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.363. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.363. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.364. 
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for not explicitly canvassing new technology in the form of wireless-based products and 
services for inclusion in the relevant markets.91 
l) ( 
( 199 1) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.363. 
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(2) THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 
The geographic dimension of the market relates to the examination and delineation of a 
particular geographic area within which suppliers of a product operate and in which 
purchasers of such goods or services are willing to "shop around" to find the best deal.92 
As with the determination of the relevant product market, elasticities of demand and supply 
are important in determining the scope of the relevant geographic market. 93 In the Tooth 
decision the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal observed:94 
"The market should comprehend the maximum range of business activities 
and the widest geographic area within which, if given sufficient economic 
incentives, buyers can switch to a substantial extent from one source of 
supply to another and sellers can switch to a substantial extent from one 
production plan to another." 
Professors Areeda and Turner in their widely-used treatise on antitrust law state that the 
dimensions of the geographic market turn on the "ability of firms to sell beyond their 
immediate locations. "95 However, this statement, while true as far as it goes , is 
potentially misleading for it tends to emphasise the supply side of the observed transactions 
at the expense of the demand side. Since the market is the arena for the interplay of 
primary supply and demand forces, emphasising one side at the expense. of the other can, 
and not infrequently does, lead to error. Thus, although the supply of rare books might be 
concentrated in Auckland and Wellington, the relevant market would not be confined to 
those two cities because the demand for this product is probably nation-wide. The buyers 
could be resident anywhere in New Zealand and their purchases could readily be forwarded 
to them. On the other hand, the fact that buyers from all over New Zealand may come to 
Wellington to buy a particular product is not enough to make the market a national one if 
the supply is local. 
The Federal Court of Australia erred in this respect in the Radio 2 U E Pty. Ltd. v Stereo 
F.M. Pty. Ltd. decision ,96 when considering a joint rate-card issued by two Sydney FM 
radio stations for advertisers on those stations. "The relevant market", Lockhart J. stated, 
92 
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Y. van Roy, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n.41. 63. 
Sec, for example, Auckland Re;?ional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (A uckland Airport) Ltd 
(1987) 2 NZLR 647,676. 
Re Tooth & Co Lid; Re Tooheys Lid (1979) ATPR ~40-113 . 18.196. 
P.E. Areeda & D.F. Turnt:r, Antitrust Law (Lillie Brown & Co. Boston, 1978) vol. II. 355. 
( 1982) ATPR ~ 40-3 18. 
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"is not the radio listening audience, but the advertisers, including advertising agencies, for 
whose business radio stations compete. The market comprises advertisers throughout 
Australia."97 In reaching the conclusion that the market was national in scope, Lockhart J. 
gave weight to the fact that "[m]any of the advertised products are sold throughout 
Australia."98 Hence it is clear that Lockhart J. looked solely at the demand-side 
considerations to the exclusion of the characteristics of the supply-side, and may even have 
been misled into studying the market in which some of the advertisers , rather than the 
defendant radio stations, were trading. Unlike rare books, radio advertising time in 
various locations is not substitutable. An advertiser who wants to reach a Sydney 
audience will not regard air-time on a Perth radio station as an acceptable substitute. 
The factors that will be relevant in defining a geographic market include: the location of 
buyers; the sales patterns of the relevant firms; the excess capacity of firms outside the 
immediate geographic area that are capable of shifting production; and market barriers that 
might limit the ability of firms to sell in particular areas (including transportation and 
distribution costs, customer convenience, physical location of resources99 , and customer 
preferences for the products of particular suppliers). 100 Thus, geographic market 
definition is not an abstract exercise, rather it is dependant upon the nature of the product 
and the competitive conditions facing the particular firm or group of firms in question. 
The geographic element of the relevant market is concerned wi_th the appropriate area within 
which the court or tribunal is to assess the level of market power possessed by the 
impugned firm. Economic theory would suggest that firms are to be grouped into the 
same geographic market if they are so located that they are able to exert a restraining 
influence on each other's exercise of market power. This concept is explained by 
Professor Hovenkamp as follows: LOI 
97 
98 
99 
too 
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(1982) ATPR ~ 40-318, 43,916. 
(1982) ATPR ~ 40-318, 43,916. 
The costs and nature of certain products may make it uneconomic to transport them very great 
distances. From the consumer's perspective a retail market is generally limited hecause consumers 
do not travel any great distance Lo differentiate retail products. The geographic market may well he 
determined hy the physical location of resources. See, B.M. Hill and M.R. Jones, Competitive 
Trudinx in New Zealand: The Commerce Act /986 (Butterworths. Wellington, 1986) 14. In the 
Trade Practice Appeal Authority's decision of Rexistered llairdressers 119611 NZLR 161, DaJglish 
J. noted at 172: ·'tt is however, of liule w;sistrmce to a prospective customer in Dunedin to know 
Lhal he may have his haircut at a cheaper rate at BaJclutha, or on the other side of Dunedin." 
J. H. Farrar and A. Borrowdale, Buuerworths Commercial Law in New Leuland , ahove n.68, 671. 
H. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law (Wesl Puhlishing Co., SL Paul 
[Minnesota!, 1985) 70. 
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"The relevant geographic market for antitrust purposes is some 'section of 
the country' in which a firm can increase its price without (1) large 
numbers of its customers immediately turning to alternative supply sources 
outside the area; or (2) producers outside the area quickly flooding the 
area with substitute products. If either of these things happen when the 
firm attempts to charge a supracompetitive price then the estimated 
geographic market has been drawn too narrowly and a larger market must 
be drawn to include these outside suppliers." 
Therefore, in delineating the geographic market we are really seeking to identify an area 
which includes a sufficient number of sellers of the product for them to have, if they chose 
to act in collusion, enough monopoly power to raise prices to a significant degree, and hold 
them there in the short to medium term, without attracting a sufficient flow of supply from 
outside to restore prices to earlier levels. 102 
(a) Imports and Market Definition 
In line with the general lowering of tariff barriers103 and the liberalisation of trade between 
New Zealand and Australia under the Closer Economic Relations Agreement 
(ANZCERT A), there has been a widespread trend for competition within the domestic 
markets of these two countries to be increasingly international in scope so that the range of 
existing and potential suppliers of goods and services to New Zealand and Australian 
consumers increasingly includes suppliers who do not produce or are not primarily 
headquartered within the nations they are supplying products too. 104 The issue of whether 
the geographic scope of the relevant market should transcend national boundaries in order 
to incorporate competition from suppliers located offshore may have considerable impact 
upon antitrust proceedings as existing or potential competition from foreign sources may 
obviously represent a significant restraint on the exercise of market power 105 by domestic 
firms within Australia and New Zealand. 
102 
103 
104 
105 
This notion received recognition within the 1982 Merxer Guidelines issued hy the United States 
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The evidence supporting this claim of internationalisation of the Australian and New Zealand 
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See. G. Hay, J.C. Hilke & P.B. Nelson. "Geographic Market Definition in an International 
Context,'" 64 Chicago Kent L. Rev 71 l. 717 ( l 988). 
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( i) The Scope of the Geographic Market 
As s.3( 1 A) of the Commerce Act defines a "market" as being "a market in New Zealand for 
goods or services" the courts and the Commerce Commission are unable to extend the 
geographic scope of the relevant market beyond New Zealand (except in relation to 
s.36A). 106 A similar restriction exists under the Trade Practices Act as s.4E of that Act 
defines the term "market" as meaning "a market in Australia". Thus, while it is obvious 
that the wording of s.3( 1 A) will prevent those goods or services that are not actually 
supplied within New Zealand from being included within the relevant market, there has 
been some recent debate as to whether or not goods or services supplied outside New 
Zealand could be taken into account when determining the effect on competition in a 
relevant market within New Zealand. This confusion has arisen from the wording of 
s.3(3) of the Commerce Act which provides: 
"For the purposes of this Act, the effect on competition in a market shall be 
determined by reference to all factors that affect competition in that market 
including competition from goods or services supplied or likely to be 
supplied by persons not resident or not carrying on business in New 
Zealand." 
The New Zealand High Court had the opportunity to interpret the ambit of s.3(3) in the 
New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd decision. 107 In this case it 
106 
107 
See. below n. 132. 
[ 1990] I NZLR 731. This case concerned the actions of Wrightson Bloodstock in causing its 
yearling thoroughbred auction near Auckland to coincide with that of Magic Millions, who had 
organised competing sales to take place at Trentham during the Wellington Spring Carnival. 
Wrightsons, who before the advent of Magic Millions had been the sole player in the market, had 
conducted sales for 60 years at Trentham on this weekend. It had. however. recently moved its 
sales location nearer to Auck.land vacating the Trentham site. Before Magic Millions entered the 
market. Wrightsons had deferred to the wishes of the Wellington Racing Club and organised its 
sales around Auckland Anniversary Weekend so as not to connict with the Wellington Spring 
Carnival. However. when Magic Millions emerged in 1989. Wrightsons(stating in evidence). saw 
a need to maintain a "competitive position. "and thereby changed its sales dates back to clash with 
those of Magic Millions, ma.king it impossible for buyers and sellers to attend both auctions. 
Wrightsons not only changed its sales date, but it allocated the sales dates between what became 
known as the K I sale of premier yearlings. and K2 which covered less valuable horses. tying 
buyers in the K I ,md K2 sub-markets together. 
In 1989 negotiations between these two competiLOrs resulted in Wrightsons changing its sale date 
so as not to coincide with the Wellington Spring Carnival. However for 1990 Wrightsons again 
set its dates to clash with the Magic Millions sale. insisting that the Commonwealth Games had 
made Lhi~ nece:s:sary. Negotiations hctwccn the competitors railed, therefore Magic Millions 
brought ,m action against Wrightsons under section 36 of the Commerce Act I 9l:<6. In the New 
Zealand High Court Tipping J found Wrightsons was in breach of s.36. His Honour noted that 
Magic Millions sales date ww; inflexible due to the requirements of its sponsor. ,md therefore 
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was argued by Wrightsons in its submission that it was not dominant in the market for 
auction sales of thoroughbred horses, that the court should take into account competing or 
potentially competing auction sales for thoroughbred horses on the east coast of Australia. 
From the point of view of economic theory it may perhaps be correct that auction sales in 
Queensland, Sydney and possibly elsewhere in Australia should be included within the 
same geographic market as New Zealand auction sales108 on the basis that these services 
are substitutable in terms of both supply and demand. 109 Doing so would of course 
greatly expand the range of suppliers who could be considered within the relevant market 
and thus greatly reduce the apparent market power of a domestic supplier. However, 
Tipping J. concluded that the statutory definition of market was not extended by s.3(3) to 
include services supplied outside of New Zealand. His Honour expressed the opinion 
that: 110 
"However desirable it may be economically to take that wider view I do not 
consider that the Act permits it. In my judgment s.3(3) should be 
construed as if it read: 
' ... including competition from goods or services supplied 
or likely to be supplied [in New Zealand] by persons not 
resident or not carrying on business in New Zealand.' 
It seems to me that it is necessary to make that implication so as to 
harmonise s.3(3) within the definition of market as being a market within 
New Zealand. In my judgment services supplied outside New Zealand by 
persons not resident or not carrying on business in New Zealand are 
irrelevant when defining the market within New Zealand or assessing 
dominance within it." 
Tipping J. supported this construction of s.3(3) by reference to the treatment of residence 
in section 4 of the Commerce Act, which states that the "Act extends to the engaging in 
conduct outside New Zealand by any person resident or carrying on business in New 
108 
109 
l l () 
granted an injunction until 31 january 1993 preventing Wrightsons from auctioning commercial 
thoroughbred yearlings at Karaka on dates to be used by Magic Millions at Trenthmn. 
[ 1990J 1 NZLR 731, 759. 
[ 1990] l NZLR 73 l, 758. See also. M. Brunt. " · Market Definition· Issues in Australian and 
New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation". above n.42 . 142. 
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Zealand to the extent that such conduct affects a market in New Zealand." 111 . Tipping J. 
then stated: 112 
"Put shortly, overseas conduct by New Zealand organisations is relevant to 
the extent that it affects the market in New Zealand. Overseas conduct by 
non New Zealand organisations should not be regarded as providing 
effective competition in a New Zealand market unless the goods or services 
are supplied within New Zealand." 
Such an interpretation of s.3(3) is subject to criticism on the basis that it undermines the 
economic concept of a market being delineated in terms of both actual competition and 
potential competition flowing from offshore sources, at a time when trans-Tasman 
economic interaction is assumed to be increasing. Such an argument is advanced by Hill 
who points out that: I 13 
"[t]here is no economic reason for limiting the influence of situations and 
firms outside New Zealand because economically and commercially there 
are no national boundaries to competitive influences, if there is actual or 
potential trade between national jurisdictions." 
However, Tipping J. appears to have given consideration to such matters in his judgment 
as is demonstrated by his Honour's reference to counsel's acknowledgment that the 
consequence of such an interpretation "might be unfortunate from the economic point of 
view and from the point of view of competition law generally, but that is something for 
Parliament and not for me."l 14 
111 
112 
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(1990] I NZLR 731. 759. In, B.M. Hill, "'A Review of Developments under Section 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986". A paper presented to the August 1990 Workshop of the Competition Law 
and Policy Institute of New Zealand (Inc.); Hill expresses the opinion at p.37 that: "Tipping J's 
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Professor Maureen Brunt also casts some doubt over the correctness of the interpretation 
accorded to s.3(3) in the Magic Millions case by expressing the view that: 115 
"It is not clear why his Honour chose to exclude the phrase 'all factors that 
affect competition in that market' that prefaces the quoted passage. What is 
clear is that particular difficulty was occasioned by the very notion of 
competition in services (as distinct from goods). The problem discerned 
was that services supplied outside New Zealand inherently lack the capacity 
to be transported to New Zealand. 
But this is to introduce an unnecessary complication to the logic. While the 
service of conducting auction sales in Australia is performed wholly outside 
New Zealand, the auction house could be employed by both Australian and 
New Zealand breeders to sell their horses. The New Zealand breeders 
import the services of Australian auctioneers in precisely the same way as a 
New Zealand patient who desires specialised surgery from an Australian 
surgeon operating in an Australian hospital imports medical services to New 
Zealand. No distinction between imports of goods and imports of services 
is drawn on National Accounts. More to the point, in the present context, 
if enough imports are undertaken or there is sufficient fear of import 
competition (whether from auction houses or Australian surgeons), the very 
content of domestic transactions will be affected: the substitution 
relationships will be affected: competition in New Zealand will be 
different.'' 
While Professor Brunt's analysis is sound from an economic perspective, it must be 
remembered that the statutory definition of market in 3(1A) 116 of the Commerce Act is 
concerned with "markets in New Zealand" (except with respect to s.36A). 117 Whereas 
s.3(3) enables the court or the Commission, when considering the effect on competition in 
115 
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M . Brunt. '" Market Definition· Issues in Australian :md New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation··. 
above n.42. 143-144. 
The change of wording in the statutory definition of market, from ·'within New Zealand" under 
s.3( I) of the Commerce Act 1986 to " in New Zealand" under s.3( I A) of the Commerce 
Amendment Act 1990 may have perhaps been seen as necessary to rebut the connection drawn by 
Tipping J in the Maxie Millions case between market definition and the assessment of 
competition. Alternatively, it may represent a decision to deprive those interpreting the section 
the opp rtunity to attribute special meaning to the word "within". However, when the definitions 
are compared the difft:rence in terminology is relatively insignificant. which is perhaps an 
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a market (in New Zealand, s.3(1A)), to take into consideration "all factors that affect 
competition in that [New Zealand] market including competition from ... persons not 
resident or not carrying on business in New Zealand." Thus it is clear that s.3(3) does not 
extend the definition of market in s.3( 1 A) to include the possibility of a single market for 
goods or services between New Zealand and Australia. 
Hence, it is submitted that the most compelling analysis to this puzzle is provided by 
Yvonne van Roy in the text, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws 118 at p. 65: 
"If the provision of services in Australia is to be taken into account under 
the Commerce Act ... then these services would have to be considered as 
imports into the New Zealand market. The New Zealand courts have never 
had to consider whether goods purchased by New Zealanders in Australia 
are imports into the New Zealand market, for these transactions are clearly 
part of the Australian market, and involve quite different costs and decisions 
(to those with respect to the importation of goods into New Zealand). The 
question is whether services are different, and whether the importation of 
services into the New Zealand market should include not only those services 
which Australians provide in New Zealand, but also services provided by 
New Zealanders in Australia. This question is really one of policy rather 
than strict interpretation of sec.3(3), The view expressed by Tipping, J. is 
probably that which is most consistent with the policy and scope of the 
Commerce Act." 
It is submitted that the enactment of s.36A within the Commerce Amendment Act 1990 
lends further support to the interpretation of s.3(3) adopted by Tipping J, as while this 
subsequent provision extended the geographic scope of the market in which a dominant 
position was to be assessed, it is made clear by s.36A( 1 ), (d), (e) and (f) that the 
geographic scope of the relevant market for assessing the impact or effect of this market 
dominance on competition is limited to "any market in New Zealand." 119 This subsequent 
amendment thereby reflects the reasoning of Tipping J ., in restricting the geographic scope 
of those substitutable goods and services which may be taken into account when 
determining the effect on competition in the relevant market under s.3(3), to those that are 
supplied or likely to be supplied within New Zealand. This would serve to reinforce the 
view of van Roy that the interpretation adopted by Tipping J is "that which is most 
118 
119 
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consistent with the policy and scope of the Commerce Act." 120 However, there is 
obviously a wide divergence of opinion as to the correct interpretation of s.3(3), such 
diversity serves to highlight the difficulties encountered when incorporating economic 
concepts within a statutory formulation of antitrust policy. 
It is interesting to note that a similar aberration in geographic market delineation appears 
within the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal's decision in Re Broken Hill Proprietary Co 
Ltd (hereinafter referred to as BHP-Koppers case) 121 . In this case the Tribunal described 
the market for steelworks tar and the processed products made from it as being "quasi-
international" and went on to add that "[ w ]e do not find it helpful to confine our attention 
too narrowly upon the domestic scene" 122. Elsewhere the Tribunal referred to the relevant 
geographic market being partly national and partly international 123. This would appear to 
mean that certain other countries, or parts of other countries, were regarded as forming part 
of the geographic market. However, it will be recalled that section 4E of the Trade 
Practices Act defines a market as a "market in Australia."124 Now it is true that section 
102(4) of the Trade Practices Act, which contains the test to be applied by the Tribunal in 
determining appeals from the Trade Practices Commission's decisions, does not mention 
the word "market", and it could therefore be argued that the Tribunal in the performance of 
its function was not bound by the statutory definition of market in s.4E. On the other 
hand, s.102(4) does require the Tribunal to consider whether any benefit to the public 
would outweigh the detriment to the public constituted by any "lessening of competition," 
and obviously such an appeal could not be pursued without first delineating the relevant 
market in which competition may have been reduced. Hence there are arguments both 
ways. However, the Tribunal did not even address itself to the problem. lndeed, there 
is, inexplicably, no mention of s.4E anywhere in the judgement at all. The approach taken 
in BHP-Koppers would, therefore, appear to be at odds with the Australian statutory 
definition of market. 
120 
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(ii) The New Trans-Tasman Market Provisions 
As part of the ANZCERT A treaty review conducted in 1988 the New Zealand and 
Australian governments agreed to remove the application of anti-dumping 125 laws to trans-
Tasman trade in goods originating in either country and to rely instead on competition 
law. 126 The first step in implementing this agreement in New Zealand was to exclude 
legislation relating to dumping investigations and to remove the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties, in respect of goods originating in Australia. 127 With the elimination of New 
Zealand's anti-dumping laws in relation to Australia, reliance has now been placed on the 
application of the Commerce Act 1986 to safeguard trans-Tasman trade from conduct 
involving the exploitation of market power. However, it was never suggested that 
competition laws would be modified to replace anti-dumping provisions. Rather, it was 
intended that the application of domestic competition laws should be extended to have 
trans-Tasman application. 
The principal provision which is relevant in this context is s.36 of the Commerce Act. 
Section 36 prohibits the use of a dominant position in a market for the purposes of 
restricting the entry of any person into a market, preventing or deterring any person from 
engaging in competitive conduct in a market, or eliminating any person from a market. 
This provision is intended to prevent the misuse of market power and with minor 
amendments to the Act it could be used to prevent such misuse in the context of a trans-
Tasman market between New Zealand and Australia. If s.36 was to operate effectively in 
the trans-Tasman context it must necessarily apply to those parties which possess the 
relevant degree of market power within the Australian domestic market, in circumstances 
where those parties have exploited this market power for one of the proscribed purposes in 
respect of a market in New Zealand. 
125 
126 
127 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), dumping is referred to as the 
imroduction of a product into the commerce of ,uiother country if the price of the product is lower 
than the price at which the same goods arc sold in the ordinary course of business in the domestic 
market of the country from which they are exported. See. T. Dellow and J. Feil. "Competition 
Law and tr,uis-Tasman trade," above n.18, 39. 
Article 4 of the protocol to ANZCERTA provides that : 
"The memher states agree that anti-dumping measures in respect of goods 
originating in the territory of the other memher state are not appropriate from the 
time of achievement of hoth free trade in goods between member states on July I 
1990 and the application of their competitive laws to relevant anticompetitive 
conduct affecting trans-Tasm,ui trade in goods." 
In New Zeahuid, the Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1988 was amended by the Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties Amendment Act 1990. passed on 29 June 1990. The Amendment Act 
c.une into force on I July 1990. 
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Hence, the Commerce Amendment Act 1990128 introduced a new s.36A together with 
certain amendments to the statutory definition of market. 129 When these associated 
amendments are incorporated into s.36A it reads as follows: 
"(1) No person who has -
(a) A dominant position in a market in New Zealand; or 
(b) A dominant position in a market in Australia; or 
(c) A dominant position in a market in New Zealand and 
Australia -
shall use that person's dominant position for the purpose of-
(d) Restricting the entry of any person into any market in New 
Zealand, not being a market exclusively for services; or 
(e) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in any market in New Zealand not being 
a market exclusively for services; or 
(f) Eliminating any person from any market in New Zealand not 
being a market exclusively for services." (Emphasis added) 
This provision is mirrored by s.46A of the Australian Trade Practices Act headed "Misuse 
of Market Power - Corporation with Substantial Degree of Power in trans-Tasman Market" 
which also came into effect on 1 July 1990. 130 When the associated definitions of "impact 
market" and "trans-Tasman market" set out within s.46A(l) 131 are incorporated into 
s.46A(2), it will read: 
128 
129 
130 
131 
"(2) A corporation that has a substantial degree of market power in a 
[market in Australia, New Zealand or Australia and New Zealand] 
must not take advantage of that power for the purpose of-
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the 
corporation ... in any [market in Australia that is not a 
market exclusively for servicesJ; or 
The Commerce Amendment Act 1990. s. I (I) states that the Commerce Amendment Act 1990 
shall be read together with and deemed part of the Commerce Act 1986. 
See, Commerce Amendment Act 1990 ss.3( I A), 3( I B) and 3( IC). 
Section 46A was incorporated into the Trade Practices 1974 by the Trade Practices (Misuse of 
trans-Tasman Market Power) Act 1990. 
Trade Practices Act 1974. s.46A( 1 ); 
"'impact market' mem1s a market in Australia that is not a market exclusively for services:·· 
"'trans-Tasman market' means a market in Australia. New Zealand or Au. tralia and New Zealand 
for goods ;md services;" 
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(b) preventing the entry of a person into [a market in Australia 
that is not a market exclusively for services]; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in [a market in Australia that is not a 
market exclusively for services] ." (Emphasis added) 
Both the Australian and New Zealand amendments distinguish between the relevant market 
in which the level of market power 132 held by the defendant is to be assessed (the " trans-
Tasman market" 133) , and the relevant market in which the defendant must be shown to 
have taken advantage of such market power for a proscribed purpose (the " impact 
market" 134). The geographic scope of the relevant (" trans-Tasman") market in which the 
degree of market power is to be assessed may be: 
• within New Zealand; 
• within Australia; 
• within both New Zealand and Australia. 
Whereas the geographic scope of the relevant market for assessing the impact of this market 
power is restricted to: 
• s.36A, "any market in New Zealand". 
• s.46A, "a market in Australia" . 
Therefore, the legislative objective which underlies the drafting of these provisions, is 
obviously " to widen the geographic definition of market for the purpose of defining the 
location of dominance. " 135 
(iii) The Chicago School Theory on the Relevance of Imports in 
Geographic Market Definition 
It is important to recall that while there is no statutory definition of the term ' market ' within 
United States antitrust legislation, the process of delineating the re levant market is 
132 
133 
134 
135 
The threshold level of market power is described in s.36A( I) of the Commerce Act as being -- .. . A 
dominant position in a market... "; Whereas. under s.46A(2) of the Trade Practices Act it is 
described as " ... a substantial degree of market power.. .··. 
See, Trade Practices Act 1974, s.46A( I). 
See. Trade Practi ces Act 1974 , s.46A( l ). 
Ministry of Commerce. '·Review of the Commerce Act 1986: Reports mid Decisions." above n.32. 
4 . 
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undertaken by the courts when applying such legislation in order to provide a medium 
within which market power can be assessed. 136 The question of whether or not foreign 
production should be counted in measuring the market power held by domestic firms 
operating within the United States is complicated and rather controversial, however, 
because frequently the issue revolves around foreign imports to the United States. 
In recent years there has been much academic debate as to the extent to which potential 
imports from foreign sources should be taken into consideration when determining the 
effect upon competition within a relevant market located in the United States. 137 This 
debate was initially triggered by two proponents of "Chicago School Thinking" 138, 
Professor Landes and Judge Posner, in their influential article "Market Power in 
Antitrust". 139 Under the so-called "Landes-Posner Assessment of Foreign 
Competition"140 it is claimed that the traditional approach to market definition in the United 
States results in an exaggeration of the domestic suppliers level of market power as 
insufficient consideration is accorded to foreign imports as a source of potential competition 
within the domestic market. Hence, they argue that, where a foreign seller has some sales 
in a local market, all of its sales, wherever made, should be considered as part of that 
relevant market for the purposes of computing the local sellers market share. 141 Their 
argument in favour of including the total production of a foreign competitor within the 
relevant geographic market is based upon the "diversion approach", by which it is reasoned 
that "because the distant seller has proved its ability to sell in the market and could incr~ase 
its sales there, should the local price rise, simply by diverting sales from other markets," 142 
such sales by the foreign competitor in offshore markets should be treated as a substitutable 
source of supply within the local market. They reason that if foreign sellers can make 
some sales in the local market then domestic producers do not have the ability to exclude 
them entirely. Thus if the foreign firms are able to make some sales "they ought to be able 
to sell many units there at no appreciably higher costs, since they have only to divert output 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
See. above n.4. 
For a useful summary of the current literature. see T. Calvini, 'The Uncertainties of International 
Geographic Markets," 32 World Competition Law & Econ. Rev. 93 ( 1988). 
The term "Chicago School Thinking" refers to the unmistakable influence of the Chicago School 
of Economics on antitrust policy in the United States. Its influence is a result of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission having been dominated 
by appointees who subscribe to Chicago School views. This coincided in part with the Reagan 
governments of 1981 m1d 1985. 
W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, "Market Power in Antitrust Cases," 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937,963 
( 1981 ), 
See, G. Hay. J.C. Hilke & P.B. Ncl:mn. "Geographic Market Definition in an International 
Context, .. above n. l 05. 724. 
W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner. "Market Power in Antitrust Cases,"above n.139. 963. 
W. M. Landes rmd R. A. Posner, "Market Power in Antitrust Cases."above n.139. 963. 
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from other markets. It follows that if the domestic producer cannot keep foreign 
production out, then the distant seller represents a limitation on the domestic firms market 
power as they are unable to raise prices without being inundated by increased competition 
from exports". 143 
In effect Landes and Posner would argue that if two domestic producers of motor vehicles 
in the United States, Chrysler and Ford, were to merge, all foreign sales of Toyota vehicles 
(even cars scheduled for sale in Japan) should be included in the local market (as Toyota 
has some sales in the United States) for the purpose of assessing the market power 
possessed by the merging companies in the United States domestic market. 144 The 
application of such an approach would clearly dilute the impugned market power of the 
domestic producers to a point where the relevant statutory competition test may not apply. 
However, the Landes-Posner approach is not without its critics. 145 Professor Hawk, for 
example, points out that there are a number of limitations on the ability of foreign producers 
to shift sales into the local market. 146 His objections to including geographically remote 
production or output include the following: 147 
(a) The ability of foreign producers to direct sales into the local market in response to a 
local price rise may be limited by foreign demand. Greater exports may cause 
prices to rise in foreign markets so that foreign producers will no longer have an 
incentive to divert sales. 
(b) Transportation facilities may not be able to cope with increased imports in the short 
run 148. 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner. ' 'Market Power in Antitrust Cases,"above n.139. 964-965. 
See, R. Pitofsky, "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust" above n.64, 
1854-1855. 
For criticisms of the Landes and Posner approach. see T.J. Brennan. " Mistaken Elasticities and 
Misleading Rules," 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 ( I 982); L. Kaplow. "The Accuracy of Traditional 
Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative·· 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1817 (1982). 
B. Hawk. U11ited Stutes. Common Market and l11temutio11ul A11titrust: A Compurarive Guide (Law 
& Business lnc./Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. New York. 1987) at 324-332 and 463-478. 
B. Hawk, U11ited Stutes, Commo11 Market a11d !11tematio11al Antitrust: A Comparative Guide. 
above n.146, at 324-332 and 463-478. 
T.J . Brennan. "Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules ,", above n.145. points out at 1849 that 
Landes and Posner's "diversion analysis" is most obviously wrong when capacity to import a 
product into the local region A from the distanl region 8 is fixed . In that case. no maller what 
price increase there may he in region A. the seller in region B cannot increase its exports into 
region A. A specific example illustrates the problem. Suppose the product in question is oil. 
mid the sole me~ms of moving oil from B to A is a pipeline that can transport only 100.000 h,UTels 
per day ,md c~mnot he expanded except at great expense. Thus it is obvious that sellers in region 8 
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(c) There may be quotas or tariffs restricting the ability of imports to provide effective 
competition. 149 
(d) Foreign imports may be sufficiently differentiated from the domestic product, so 
that imports may only satisfy a small segment of the local market, such that foreign 
sellers cannot readily sell in response to a local price increase. 
(e) Foreign sellers may have long term commitments to consumers and distributors in 
their own domestic markets.150 
(f) If the local price increase is a result of a lack of domestic capacity, imports may 
only be a temporary phenomenon if domestic capacity increases. 
(g) Whether foreign sellers would be prepared to divert sales "involves numerous 
imponderables, including home market politics and the depth of [their] export 
commitments to other countries."151 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not directly addressed the problem of defining 
a relevant geographic market for situations where an impugned party is operating on a 
worldwide basis, but in defining relevant geographic markets for wholly domestic mergers 
and acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court has stressed that 
commercial realities and economic considerations must dominate the analyses. 152 The 
foundation for any market definition analysis under section 7 was established by the 
Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v United States (hereinafter to be referred to as Brown 
Shoe) 153 in which it was stated that "the boundaries of the relevant markets must be drawn 
with sufficient breadth to include the competing products of each of the merging companies 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
will be unable to divert a higher ratio of their output into region A in the short run in response to 
an increase in the price of oil in region A. 
The realities of world trade would suggest that if any such diversion began to develop. the 
importing country would modify tariffs or quotas to insure that its domestic industry is not 
overwhelmed. 
The idea that Toyota would abandon its distributors and customers in Japan to take advantage of a 
price increase in the United States may make sense theoretically but in practice it is inconceivable. 
as a diversion of total production by Toyota to a distant market would have long-term strategic 
consequences with respect to their distributors ~md customers in the Japanese domestic market. 
B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide. 
above n.146, 467-468. 
United States v Philadelphia National Bank. 374 US 321. 359 ( 1963); Brown Shoe Co. v United 
States. 370 US 294, 336-337 ( 1962); United States v Pabst Brewing Co ., 384 US 546. 549 
( 1966). 
370 us 294 ( 1962). 
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and to recognise competition where, in fact, competition exists."154 In Brown Shoe, the 
Court also emphasised that under the terms of s.7, "[t]he geographic market selected must 
... both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically 
significant." 155 
In United States v Philadelphia National Bank,156 the Supreme Court defined the 
geographic market in a bank merger action as that area" 'in which the seller operates, and 
to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies '. "157 In brief, the threatened 
foreclosure of competition in any merger action under s.7 must be in relation to the market 
affected. 158 Thus, the Supreme Court's traditional approach to market analysis for alleged 
violations of s.7 suggests the propriety of using market dimensions which are sufficiently 
broad so as to recognise competition in an industry outside the national borders of the 
United States, if such a source of competition in fact exists and has a measureable impact 
upon competition within the United States. 
Although the legislative history is silent on the permissibility of world markets, courts and 
enforcement agencies have in the past discerned a Congressional intent in the phrase " in 
any section of the country" included within s.7, 159 that market analysis should be 
conducted with regard to particular geographic segments of the United States. 160 The crux 
of the legal dispute over defining a geographical market in global terms, therefore, arises 
from the apparent domestic focus of the provision itself. A literal interpretation of the 
phrase, "in any section of the country," appears to support the conclusion that the effects of 
a merger must only be examined in the context of a market area within the United States. 
Consequently, courts in the United States have been reluctant to test the geographic 
parameters of the Clayton Act by using market definitions which transcend the national 
territorial boundary.161 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
370 us 294, 326 ( 1962). 
370 us 294, 336 ( 1962). 
374 us 32 1 ( 1963) . 
374 us 32 1, 359 ( 1963) 
Tampu Elec1ric Co. v Nushville Coul Co .. 365 US 329. 337 (1961 ). 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or 
indirectly, the whole or m1y part of the stock or other share capital. and no corporation subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets 
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in uny sec lion of 
the cowury, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition . or to tend to 
create a monopoly." (Emphasis added) 
See. e.g., United Stutes v Trucindu lnveslmenl Corp .. 477 F. Supp. 1093. 1105 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 
1979). 
E.W. Kitner. Federul An1i1rus1 Luw (Anderson Publishing Co .. Cincinnati [Ohio], 1984) vol.IV, 
497. 
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One exception to this general rejection of world geographic markets is the California 
District Court's ruling in United States v Tracinda Investments Carp.(hereinafter referred to 
as Tracinda), 162 an action concerning the acquisition of a controlling stock interest by an 
American shareholder in a domestic corporation involved in the business of producing 
motion pictures. The foreign element of this action arose from evidence indicating that 
there existed a world market in which motion picture producers operated and to which the 
distributors could practicably turn for supplies of motion pictures. 163 Therefore, a 
worldwide geographic market was supported by both production and consumption patterns 
in the affected motion picture industry, making it a commercially realistic geographic 
dimension within which to determine the effects of the proposed stock acquisition. 
The evidence in Tracinda showed that foreign-produced pictures directly compete in the 
United States with American produced films, and that American production companies 
derived much of their income from foreign distribution. 164 Therefore, Hauk J. found that 
"the most relevant geographic market for motion pictures is the entire world." 165 
However, in a footnote to the opinion, Hauk J. added that this did not mean that the Court 
would look to the worldwide effects of a merger for all purposes, in light of the phrase "in 
any section of the country" included within section 7 of the Clayton Act. 166 Thus, the 
Court's conclusion "with respect to the geographic market rest[ ed] in a recognition of the 
extent to which the worldwide nature of this industry affects competition here in the United 
States." 167 
Thus, the Tracinda case may perhaps indicate a greater willingness on the part of the courts 
in the United States (in line with the increasing influence of "Chicago School thinking" on 
American antitrust policy 168) to go beyond the traditional definition of the relevant 
geographic market under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as only including those imports 
which are actually present within the domestic market, to the inclusion of potential output 
of foreign suppliers which may be diverted into the local market if the economic incentive is 
sufficient. Such an observation may also be supported by reference to the 1984 Merger 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
477 F. Supp. 1093, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
477 F. Supp. 1093. 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
477 F. Supp. 1093. 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
477 F. Supp. 1093. 1105 n. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
477 F. Supp. 1093. 1105 n. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
Ahove n. 138. 
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Guidelines subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice, 169 which states 
that if production, either foreign or domestic, outside of a particular geographic market 
within the United States, would be diverted into that market in the event of a substantial 
increase in price, then that outside production should be counted to some extent m 
measuring the market power held by firms operating within that geographic area. 
(3) THE FUNCTIONAL MARKET 
The relevant functional market refers to the 'horizontal level' of production or distribution 
at which a firm operates in the life cycle of a product, e.g., manufacturing, wholesaling or 
retailing. 170 Markets exist between functional levels as goods move from a person at one 
level to a person at another. In this sense the functional aspect is the hinge upon which the 
definition of a market turns because it determines which particular buyers and sellers meet 
each other with the same competitive interest. For while parties to a trade practice or a 
merger or takeover proposal may deal in the same goods or services, the functional 
dimension of the market gives recognition to the fact that these firms may be operating at 
different stages or levels, 171 so that firms within the same industry 172 will not necessarily 
be viewed as competitors in the same market. 173 
However, the decision of both the New Zealand High Court and the Court of Appeal in Tru 
Tone 174 provides an example of two separate functional levels of the market being fused 
into one broad functional market. The facts of the Tru Tone case were complicated, but 
basically concerned the use by Festival RML Ltd of a system of maximum retail pricing of 
Top 50 albums and the enforcement of this price by means of refusals to supply key 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
Department of Justice Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg.Rep.(CCH) ~ 13,103 (June 14. 1984) [hereinafter 
referred to as the 1984 Merger Guidelines] §3.23. See, R. Pitofsky, "New Definitions of 
Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust" above n.64. 1854-1855. 
Y. van Roy, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws. above n.41. 62. 
Y. van Roy, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n.41. 62. 
A market is not the same as an industry. An industry is a grouping of firms making related 
products. A market is the structure through which products are moved to purchasers. An 
industry may serve mm1y seperate markets. For instance. the steel industry produces a vast range 
of products from steel sheet through to girders and wire which may all properly be grouped into 
different markets. Conversely, a market may be served by many different industries. The market 
for housing construction materials. for instance. is served by the brick industry, the timber 
industry. the glass industry and many more. Similarly, buyers for a number of industries may be 
purchasing products in the same market. The steel industry. for exmnple. serves the steel sheet 
market in which manufacturers of white goods. automobiles and aircraft are all purchasers. See. 
M. Brunt, .. 'Market Definition· Issues in Austrafom and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation", 
above n.42. 130. 
On the question of whether conduct at one functional level can affect competition at others. see 
Pluteus (No.8) Pty Ltd v G.J. Coles & Co Ltd (1983) ATPR ~40-391. 44.584. 
(1988) 2 NZBLC 103,081 (HC); [1988] 2 NZLR 352 (CA) 
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retailers who chose to charge prices in excess of the stipulated maximum price. In the 
recording industry, the first functional level involves recording artists, as sellers, 
negotiating with recording companies as buyers, for recording contracts. The next 
functional level is where recording companies manufacture, and distribute as wholesalers, 
albums to retailers. The third functional level is where the retailers then sell albums 
directly to the public. The buyers and sellers will be different at each functional level, and 
therefore one could expect different patterns of competition to exist at each functional level. 
However, the High court fused the last two functional levels just mentioned into a single 
functional market because "the promotion which propels an album to a top place in the chart 
and therefore creates its demand is generated by the distributor who, at that initial stage, 
conducts his campaign over the head of the retailer as it were, seeking to create demand 
directly through television, radio and other publicity among the customers." 175 This 
analysis helped the Court to view each album as a clear substitute for albums previously 
released, for "when an album is enjoying popularity, promotion of another is gathering 
momentum." 176 
The important role which the functional dimensions of the market may play in overall 
market analysis can be seen in the Telecom decision. 177 In this case the High Court 
outlined the following principles governing functional identification and their application to 
the particular factual situation presented to the Court: 178 
175 
176 
177 
178 
"lf we ask what functional divisions are appropriate in any market definition 
exercise the answer, plainly enough, must be whatever will best expose the 
play of market forces, actual and potential, upon buyers and sellers. 
Whenever successive stages of production and distribution can be co-
ordinated by market transactions, there is no difficulty: there will be a series 
of markets linking actual and potential buyers and sellers at each stage. 
And again, when pronounced efficiencies of vertical integration dictate that 
successive stages of production and distribution must be co-ordinated by 
internal managerial processes, there can be no market. But a feature of this 
application is the presence of the integrated PSTN [Public Switched 
Telephone Network] linking all members of the community in innumerable 
two-party and multi-party communications; and there is also the possibility 
of some market transactions along the way, i.e., in interconnections with 
(1988) 2 NZBLC 103.081. 103.089 (HC): [1988] 2 NZLR 352. 360 (CA). 
(1988) 2 NZBLC 103.081. 103.089 (HC): [1988) 2 NZLR 352. 360 (CA). 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239 , 102,363. 
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duplicate or by-pass networks and in leased circuits as permitted by the 
incidence of economies of scale and scope . 
. In this case (and with no artificial regulatory requirements limiting the 
freedom of entry to particular segments of the network, as in the United 
States) we think it best to regard the functional delineation of the standard 
telephone services as the whole PSTN, comprising the largely fixed 
facilities for the supply of local, national and international service to 
households, firms and interconnected suppliers (such as Clear). The PSTN 
comprises both the trunking network and the local loop." 
For the mobile telephone service, however, the Court distinguished three functional 
levels. 179 Firstly, network operation and service supply such as that conducted by 
Telecom Cellular Ltd, providing service, including air-time, on a wholesale basis for 
Telecom Approved Service Providers (TASP's). Secondly, distribution of connections, 
continuing access and usage, such as that provided by the four "service providers", the 
T ASP' s. Finally, the retailing of mobile service contracts and hand sets such as that 
conducted by over 150 Telecom dealers. 
The Court found that the Commerce Commission's market delineation was inadequate in its 
treatment of the functional dimension of the market. 180 in particular, it was critical of the 
Commission for its failure to identify the PSTN as the fundamental ingredient of the 
standard telephone service and, also , for making no reference to the various functional 
levels in the provision of the mobile services. The Court indicated that its own findings 
led it to give the PSTN greater prominence in its decision than did the Commerce 
Commission. The Court also found that wholesale distribution and retailing functional 
level was of some relevance in its assessment of dominance in the mobile telephone 
market. 181 
However, it is important to keep in mind that due to the relatively small size of the domestic 
economy there is a significant level of "vertical integration" within New Zealand, 182 so that 
many firms will perform more than one distinct function within the distribution chain (e.g. , 
a firm may be involved in both manufacturing and retailing a particular product). Thus, 
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(1991) 3 NZBLC 199-239. 102.364. 
([991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.365. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC 199-239. 102.365 . 
See, B. M. Hill ~U1d M. R. Jones, Compe1i1ive Tradin x in New Lea/and: The Commerce Ac! ! 9R6. 
above n.99 . 14-15. 
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there may be times when the distinctions between the "horizontal levels" of an industry are 
blurred and the functional market is, therefore, difficult to determine. 183 
(4) THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION 
All market parameters change over time as participants enter and exit from markets, or as 
barriers to entry become relevant. 184 Some products have a short "shelf' life and others 
are subject to rapid technological evolution or changes in fashion. In one sense it is the 
time lag between changes in consumer preference and producer response which is the very 
heart of competition law policy. In a perfectly competitive market the response would be 
immediate, but in many markets restrictive trade practices inhibit this process of transition 
to the detriment of consumers and effective resource allocation. 185 The reality of potential 
competition and the timing of its impact will therefore often be the decisive factor in 
determining the level of workable and effective competition in any particular market. 
Hence in determining the relevant market it will be necessary to consider the time period 
over which the degree of substitutability is to be assessed. 
Over a period of time, a position of market power will tend to be eroded as customers turn 
to other products as substitutes for the monopolised one ('cross-elasticity of demand'), and 
as other suppliers, seeing that the cartel or dominant concern is able to reap monopoly 
profits, enter the market in order to share in some of those profits and, by increasing the 
183 
184 
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The first Chairman of the Commerce Commission discussed this problem in relation to the 
Cement Industry Inquiry (Commerce Commission, "Report of the Commerce Commission 
Following an Inquiry into the Question of Removal of Cement from the Positive List of 
Controlled Goods and Services 1981 and an Inquiry into Certain Matters Relating to Price Control 
and Pricing Practices in the Manufacturing and Distribution of Cement" (Wellington, 1986)) and 
gave the following guidance as to how the Commission might determine the matter: 
"For example, the market for wholesale distribution of cement (i.e .. the resale of cement by 
merchants to user and reseller) would be likely to be considered separately from the sale of cement 
by manufacturers to wholesalers. Should the market for primary distribution (i.e., from cement 
works to bulk storage depots) be considered separately? This will depend particularly upon 
whether it would be unrealistic for primary distribution to be separated from manufacture. If the 
distribution process is interlinked with that of production or if there arc few options for transport 
facilities other than those used by the cement companies or if customers look to buy cement 
locally rather than ex-factory. then the Commission may be reluctant to consider primary 
distribution as a separate market. However. there may well be industries in which the function of 
transport from ex-works to selling depots can be regarded as a separate market or trade." 
See. Wat1ies Industries Ltd/Taylor Free:er /foldings lid. Commerce Commission Decision No. 
127 (16 May 1985). 7: "'Although no barriers are totally insunnounutble for all time. and although 
governmental barriers as to imports, tariffs and investments in this industry may he lifted further 
we think there are sufficient practical barriers in this industry (contributed to by this proposal) 10 
have a considerable dmnpening effect - so as to make the possibility of effective competition 
remote." 
See, B. M. Hill and M. R. Jones, Comperitive Tradi11g i11 N ew Zealand: The Commerce Act l9R6. 
above n.99. 15. 
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supply, ultimately increase competition and drive the price down ('cross-elasticity of 
supply'). Thus, in the 1920's, when both the supply of and the demand for coal in the 
United States was thought to be inelastic, a coal monopoly or cartel would have been 
regarded as having great market power. Over time, however, coal users have turned to 
other sources of energy such as hydro-electricity, oil and gas, while the discovery of new 
coalfields has shown that the supply of coal itself is elastic. 186 However, this process of 
substitution took many years. What time lag in substitution should be regarded as being 
too long to qualify the alternative product or alternative producer as being within the 
relevant market?l87 
The reaction time that one would tend to regard as too long will obviously vary with the 
nature of the particular product in question . A delay of 12 months might be considered too 
lengthy a period in the clothing industry, but not in the coal mining industry, where lead-
times for expansion are much longer. If a time factor which is too short is assumed, the 
market will be defined too narrowly, thereby overstating the power of the parties to 
disregard competition. Conversely, market power would be understated if too long a time 
factor is assumed. Therefore, the time parameter must be a matter of judgement, although 
common sense would dictate that it should be based on an analysis of evidence about the 
"commercial realities" of a particular industry and not on inferences at large. 188 
The Trade Practices Tribunal declared in the re Tooth & Co Ltd decision that it was 
concerned with longer run, rather than short-run, substitution possibilities: 189 
186 
187 
188 
189 
"It is plain that the longer the period allowed for likely cu tomer and 
supplier adjustments to economic incentives, the wider the market 
delineated. ln our judgement, given the policy objectives of the legislation, 
See, K. Elzinga and T. Hogarty, "The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The 
Case of Coal," 23 Antitrust Bull. 1 ( 1978); P. Griffin and J. Kusher. ''Geographic Submarkets in 
Bituminous Coal," 21 Antitrust Bull. 67 ( I 976); T. Schwartzman, "The Cross-Elasticity of 
Demand and Industry Boundaries: Coal, Oil. Gas and Uranium." 18 Antitrust Bull. 483 ( I 973); 
R.E. Shrieves, "Geographic Market Areas and Market Structure in the Bituminous Coal Industry.'' 
23 Antitrust Bull. 589 ( 1978). 
This question usually arises in the context of the product market: as supplies of most commodities 
can be brought in from other geographic areas relatively quickly. whereas developing substitutes or 
expanding competitive productive capacity nonnally takes much longer. See, G.de Q. Walker, 
above n.12. 391. 
Sec, True Tone Ltd v F esrivul Records Rewil Murketin)!, Ltd [ l 988 I 2 NZLR 352. per Richardson 
J. at 360: ''Viewed in relation to product ,Uld time the single album definition of market ignores 
commercial realities. It focuses on short run phenomenon. It represents a snapshot rather than a 
moving picture of continuing commercial activity ... [T]he movement of albums in and out or the 
charts. and their constantly shifting positions arc clear evidence or the manner in which. and the 
extent to which substitution takes place." 
(1979) ATPR ~40-113. 18,196. 
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it serves no useful purpose to focus attention upon a short-run, transitory 
situation. We consider we should be basically concerned with substitution 
possibilities in the longer run. This does not mean we seek to prophesy the 
shape of the future - to speculate upon how community tastes, or 
institutions, or technology might change. Rather, we ask of the evidence 
what is likely to happen to patterns of consumption and production were 
existing suppliers to raise price or, more generally, offer a poorer deal. For 
the market is the field of actual or potential rivalry between firms." 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has also emphasised the desireability of considering 
substitution possibilities in "the long run," within the True Tone decision. 190 
As we have already noted, 191 the New Zealand High Court in Telecom was concerned with 
the temporal dimension of the relevant market. In considering whether technology that is 
still being developed should be considered as substitutable for existing services (and 
therefore as affording potential competition in the same market), the Court accepted 
Telecom's argument that the Commission adopted too short a time perspective. 192 It 
shoul~ have expressly canvassed new technology in the form of wireless-based products 
and systems. 193 However, this omission was not fatal and the Court concluded that the 
Commission gave adequate recognition to the overall dynamic forces in the industry.194 
The basic lesson is that market boundaries should be described in terms that do not 
unwittingly preclude consideration of prospects for new entry, as would, for example, a 
description of the market as the cellular telephone services market, rather than the mobile 
telephone services market. 195 Therefore, in considering the constraints upon market 
incumbents, the court or tribunal should pay adequate and appropriate regard to dynamic 
forces within that relevant market. 196 
In short, the Court's criticism of the Commission's failure to address the dynamism of the 
market was aimed at the short term perspective taken by the Commission. 197 In particular, 
it was concluded that the Commission had failed to adequately consider the ability of other 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
True Tone Ltd v F esrival Records Retail Markering Ltd [ 1988 I 2 NZLR 352. 360. 
See. above n.87. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102,363 m1d 102.365. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.363. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.364. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.364. 
(l 991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, I 02.364. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239, 102.365. 
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firms to redeploy existing capacity, 198 and the extent to which technological change (a 
fundamental characteristic of telecommunications markets) could be accommodated within 
the parameters of those relevant markets described by the Commission. 199 
Despite the fact that the primary focus of courts and tribunals in proceedings under the 
Commerce Act and the Trade Practices Act will be on longer run substitution possibilities 
considerations relating to substitution possibilities in a short-run sense may not be 
altogether irrelevant, as shown by the following discussion of the concept of sub-
markets. zoo 
198 
199 
200 
( 1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.364 .u1d 102.365. 
(1991) 3 NZBLC ~99-239. 102.365. 
See. helow n.202. 
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PART IV 
4. THE CONCEPT OF SUB-MARKETS 
As an aid to the determination of the relevant market the concept of a 'sub-market' may in 
certain circumstances be useful where there exists substitution possibilities that are 
important in a short-run sense, in terms of both supply and demand. For instance mens 
and womens shoes might well be placed in different markets on purely demand side 
substitution criteria, for it is unlikely that an increase in the price of mens or womens shoes 
relative to the other will induce a significant swing in consumption to the other type. From 
the supply viewpoint, however, the technological similarities in the production of mens and 
womens shoes, using given materials, are more likely to suggest that mens and womens 
shoes should be considered as coming within the one market, because production 
substitution could be achieved within a short period of time. Yet, to penetrate the 
characteristics and interests of buyers, it may be useful to delineate individual sub-markets 
(e.g. , mens shoes, womens shoes, and childrens shoes) within the broader footwear 
market. 
The notion of a sub-market has proved to be a source of great confusion for antitrust 
jurisprudence in the United States.2°1 However, if used properly the concept of a sub-
market can be a useful aid to competition analysis within the Trade Practices Act and the 
Commerce Act. Few problems should arise with this concept if courts and tribunals in 
Australia and New Zealand keep in mind the qualifications expressed by the Trade Practices 
Tribunal in QCMA202: 
201 
202 
"The distinction between markets and sub-markets can be merely one of 
degree. Sub-markets are the more narrowly defined, typically registering 
some discontinuity in substitution possibilities. Where the defining feature 
of a market is the existence of close substitutes (whether in demand or 
supply) , the defining feature of a sub-market is the existence of still closer 
and more immediate substitutes. Sub-markets may be especially useful in 
registering the short-run effects of change; but they may be misleading if 
used uncritically to assess Long run competitive effe cts". (Emphasis added) 
See, below n.212. 
( 1976) ATPR ~40-012, 17,247. See also. Re f-lowurd Smith Industries Pty Ltd ( 1977) ATPR 
~40-023, 17 ,337. 
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In that case the relevant product markets were found to be flour and bread, however, 
baker's flour was held to be an important sub-market of the flour market. 203 The Tribunal 
then proceeded to study the play of competitive forces in that sub-market as indicative of 
the likely effects of the proposed merger in the overall market for flour. 
The Tribunal has subsequently presented a more carefully developed analysis of the sub-
market concept in the re Tooth & Co Ltd decision:204 
" ... within the bounds of the market, substitution possibilities may be more 
or less intense and more or less immediate: the field of substitution is not 
necessarily homogeneous but may contain within it sub-markets wherein 
competition is especially close or especially immediate. There may be, too, 
certain key sub-markets such that their competitive relationships have a 
wider effect upon the functioning of the market as a whole. In these 
matters we have found that the identification of relevant sub-markets may be 
rather helpful in clarifying how competition works." 
One of the issues which arose in this case was the extent to which Tooth ' s exclusive 
dealing restrictions effectively lessened competition in a market. As these exclusive 
dealing restrictions applied only to bulk beer, not packaged beer, it was argued that the 
relevant product market should be confined to the production and distribution of bulk beer. 
However, the evidence of substitutability on both the demand and supply sides persuaded 
the Tribunal that bulk and packaged beer properly belonged within the same relevant 
market. The Tribunal did, however, state that bulk beer was a significant sub-market 
which would repay close study.205 
There are at least two distinct ways by which the sub-market concept may be utilised , one 
of which is helpful and one of which, it is submitted , will merely cause confusion and 
inconsistency within the process of market analysis. Firstly, under what is generally 
referred to as the " American approach"206, the notion of a sub-market may be equated with 
the relevant market itself. Thus, in United States antitrust litigation , " liability can attach as 
a result of dominance or market power in a sub-market" .207 This line of reasoning had its 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
(1976) ATPR ~40-0 I 2, 17,248. 
(1979) ATPR ~40-113, 18 ,197. 
(1979) ATPR ~40-11 3. 18.198. 
See. M. Brunt. .. ' Markel Definition· Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Praclices 
Litigation ," above n.42, 144. See al so. New Zealand Magi c Millions Ltd v Wri )?h1so11 Bloods1ock 
Ltd [1990] I NZLR 731 , 752. 
New Zealand Ma)? ic Millions Ltd v Wrigh1son 8 loodswck Ltd l 1990 I I NZLR 73 I. 752. 
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genesis in the United States v Bethlehem Steel Corp decision,208 but was first enunciated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co v United States. 2Cf) This approach 
is clearly spelt out in the recent decision of Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp v Aspen Skiing 
Co,210 where Aspen Skiing Co was found to have monopolised the market for downhill 
skiing services at Aspen in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Holloway J. 's 
instruction to the jury in that case contained the following statement:211 : 
"There can be both a relevant market and a relevant sub-market or just a 
relevant market without any relevant sub-market. Thus, if you decided that 
the relevant product market is downhill skiing at destination ski resorts, you 
must still determine whether downhill skiing services, including multi-area, 
multi-day lift tickets is a submarket within a larger market." 
This use of the sub-market concept has been rightly criticised on the ground that it is self-
contradictory to hold that both a broad area is a market and that smaller parts of that same 
area are also markets. 212 As Professor Posner points out, in this sense "a sub-market 
would be a group of sellers from which sellers of good substitutes in consumption or 
production had been excluded, and these exclusions would deprive any market-share 
statistics of their economic significance."213 Such an approach may also be criticised on 
the basis that, where the relevant market is to be narrowed down to what might have been 
referred to as a sub-market, then the term 'sub-market' should logically lapse, for as 
Donald and Heydon contend "[t]here are just more markets, not sub-markets".214 
ln light of such criticism it is important to note that in the New Zealand context a similar 
line of reasoning (to the "American approach") appears to have been incorporated within 
208 
209 
210 
21 I 
212 
213 
214 
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Sec. P. Areeda and D.F. Turner. Antitrust Law. above n.95. 
vol II, 409-411. 
370 US 294 (1962). In this case the Supreme Court commented at 325 that: "The outer 
houndaries of a product market arc dctermined hy the reasonable interchangeability of use or the 
cross-elasticity of demand hetween the product itself and substitutes for it. However. within this 
hroad market. well-defined suhmarkets may exist which. in themselves. constitute product markets 
for antitrust purposes ... Because §7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may 
suhstantially lessen competition 'in any line of commercc· (emphasis supplied). it is necessary to 
ex,unine the effects of a merger in each such economically significant suhmarket to determine if 
there is a reasonable probability that the mcrger will suhstantially lessen competition. If such a 
prohability is found to exist. the merger is proscribed." 
738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984). 
738 F.2d 1509. 1528-1529 (10th Cir. 1984). 
P. Areeda and D.F. Turner, Antitrust Law, ahove n.95, 411. 
R. Posner, Antitrus1 Law (Harvard University Press, C.unbridgc [Massachusetts]. 1976) 126. 
B. Donald ,uid J.D. Hcydon, Tf'llde Pf'llclices Law (Law Book Co .. Sydney. 1978) 98. 
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the New Zealand High Court's decision in the ARA case.215 In delivering the judgement 
in this case, Barker, J. held that the relevant market was that of providing rental car 
services to airline passengers at Auckland airport. 216 However, his Honour also 
described this relevant market as a sub-market of the national geographic market for rental 
car services in New Zealand. 217 Thus, Barker, J. appears to have fallen into the trap of 
equating the notion of a sub-market with that of the relevant market itself. 
Secondly, identifying sub-markets can be used as a way of clarifying how competition 
works within the broader market, rather than employing it as the field in which competition 
is conducted. This is the sense in which the concept has been used by the Trade Practices 
Tribunal218 in such cases as QCMA 21 9 and re Tooth & Co Ltcf220 . The distinction 
between this approach and the "American approach" is brought to the fore in the Australian 
Federal Court's decision in TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd, where Franki J. 
concluded221 : 
"I think it is correct to say that the word 'market' in sec.45(3) should be 
read as referring to a relevant market rather than a relevant sub-market 
although it may be very helpful to examine the degree of competition in a 
particular sub-market and then apply the conclusion to a consideration of the 
position in the whole market." 
While, in the context of New Zealand's Commerce Act 1986, Tipping, J. has made a 
similar distinction between the two concepts of 'relevant market' and sub-market' in the 
New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd decision222 : 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
"It appears that in America in antitrust cases, liability can attach as a result of 
dominance or market power in a sub-market ... But that is not the position 
in New Zealand and it is not, as I understand it, the position in Australia 
either. There is no doubt however that the concept of a sub-market may be 
used as a convenient tool of analysis of the dynamics of a market." 
[ 1987) 2 NZLR 647. 
f 1987) 2 NZLR 647. 677. 
[1987] 2 NZLR 647. 671. 
The Trade Practices Commission has done likewise in a number of cases such as CRA Services 
Ltd. Unreported. 4 November 1976. Trac.le Practices Commission. Sydney, C22435: where a broad 
market was identified as resources mid energy with a specific suh-markct heing stipulated m; ·coal'. 
( 1976) ATPR ~40-012. 
(1979) ATPR ~40-113. 
(1985) ATPR ~40-512, 64.143. 
( 1990) I NZLR 731, 752 (HC). 
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Therefore, in regard to the Commerce Act 1986 and the Trade Practices Act 197 4, the 
fundamental utility of the sub-market concept, both to applicants and the determining 
authorities, is that it conveys the sense of varying degrees of substitutability without 
attempting to catalogue the whole complexity of the market place. Furthermore, this 
notion may help to bridge the gap between short-run considerations or conceptions of a 
'market' and those notions that are relevant to the long-run competitive issues to which the 
Commerce Act and the Trade Practices Act are fundamentally addressed. 223 Therefore, it 
is to be concluded that it would be most unfortunate if criticisms generated by the 
"American approach" were to lead New Zealand and Australian courts and tribunals to 
abandon their own distinctive concept of a sub-market. 
223 Sec. above n.189 ,u,d n.190. 
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PART V 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Commerce Act 1986 and the Trade Practices Act 197 4 contain statutory definitions of 
the term 'market' that are to be interpreted with the aid of the economic concept of 
substitutability. Hence, the market delineation process in New Zealand and Australian 
competition law is necessarily a task of mixed legal-economic analysis. However, such an 
approach to market definition, involving lengthy argument by counsel and the tendering of 
expert economic evidence on actual and potential demand and supply substitution, has 
arguably further increased the cost of litigation224 without necessarily shedding much light 
upon the real focus of such proceedings, which is the degree of 'market power' possessed 
by the defendant in the relevant market. For as Pincus, J. observed in the Australia Meat 
Holdings Pty Ltd v TPC decision:225 
" ... the process of identification of the relevant market must be carried out 
keeping in mind the object of doing so; in the instant case that is to 
determine whether the appellant was at the relevant time in a position to 
dominate the market, or was by the acquisition placed in such position. 
The linking together of the process of definition of the market and its object 
implies some flexibility in the former." 
Thus, if market definition is to be an aid to competition analysis it must serve to concentrate 
attention upon the defendant's market power, as too great a focus upon market delineation 
per se will inevitably cause this fundamental fact to be overlooked. To this end, Australian 
and New Zealand courts and tribunals should keep in mind the following comment by 
Franklin Fisher226: 
224 
225 
226 
Sec. the observation by Wilcox , J. in Aus1ralia Meat 1/oldinxs Pty Ltd v TPC ( 1988) ATPR 40-
876. 49,479-49,480: "Economists are able to assist the court in relation to economic principles. 
But once, the relevant principles are expounded, their application to the facts of the case is a matter 
for the court. The proper definition of a market is entirely a matter of fact. the determination of 
which ought not to be made more protracted and expensive by the adduction of unnecessary 
economic evidence." 
(1989) ATPR 140-932, 50,104. Sec also. Queensland Wire l11dus1ries P1y Ltd v Broke11 Ifill Pty 
Co Ltd (1989) ATPR 140-925. 50.008: Telecom Corpora1io11 of New Zeala11d Ltd v Commerce 
Commission ( 1991) 3 NZB LC ~99-239, 102.361. 
F.M. Fisher, "'Diagnosing Monopoly". above n.16. 13. Similar sentiments have also been 
expressed by the New Zealand High Court in Telecom Corpora/ion of New Zealand Ltd v 
Commerce Commissio11 ( 1991) 3 NZBLC 99-239. I 02.360-102.361: ·'tn both the AustraJiw1 .u1d 
New Zealand jurisdictions it has been said. in effect. that a mechanical reliance upon substitution 
criteria in a contextual vacuum is not sufficient..."'. Hence the boundarit:s should be drawn hy 
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" ... the primary question in defining a relevant market ought to be that of 
constraints on the alleged monopolist. The principal constraints can be of 
two types, those relating to demand and those relating to supply. The 
courts have paid appropriate attention to demand and supply substitutability 
- appropriate because these are criteria by which to judge the constraints on 
the alleged monopolist. It should not be forgotten, however, that it is the 
constraints which are the object of analysis and not the properties of 
substitutability themselves." 
Economic theory often suggests that there is no one "right" market, but a collection of 
interlinked markets, so that all sellers face competitive impacts of ever reducing significance 
from other firms ranged further and further away from them.227 As Deane, J. pointed out 
in the Queensland Wire Industries case228: 
"The economy is not divided into an identifiable number of discrete markets 
into one or other of which all trading activities can be neatly fitted. One 
overall market may overlap other markets and contain more narrowly 
defined markets which may, in their turn, overlap, the one with one or more 
others. The outer limits (including geographic confines) of a particular 
market are likely to be blurred: their definition will commonly involve ~n 
assessment of the relative weight to be given to competing considerations in 
relation to questions such as the extent of product substitutability and the 
significance of competition between traders at different stages of 
distribution." 
The preceding discussion on the various dimensions of the market concept serves to 
demonstrate that, important as they are, the notions of demand and supply substitutability 
will not provide a complete solution to the task of market definition as a question of degree 
is involved (i.e., at what point do different goods or services become closely enough linked 
in terms of supply or demand so as to be included in the one market?)229. Hence, it would 
227 
228 
229 
reference to the conduct at issue, the terms of the relevant sec tion or sec tions, and the policy of the 
statute. Some judgement is required, bearing in mind that ' market ' is an instrumental concept 
designed to clarify the sources and potential effects of market power that may be possessed by an 
enterprise.". 
L.A. Sullivan, A!ltitrust, above n.4, 64. 
( 1989) ATPR ~40-925, 50.013. 
See, Queellslalld Wire f!ldustri es Pty Ltd v Broke/I I/ill Pty Co. Ltd (l 989) ATPR ~40-925. 
50.015; See also, M. Brunt." ·Market Definition · Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade 
Practices Litigation," above n.42, 149-152. 
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be fallacious to assume that a relevant market may be delineated solely by reference to the 
concept of substitutability within the different dimensions of the market, as a court or 
tribunal will still be required to perform an act of judgement as to the appropriate level of 
substitutability that is required to include different products in the same market. Since that 
judgement is necessarily subjective in nature, the resulting delineation of the relevant 
market may not always be seen as consistent or predictable. Therefore, it is submitted that 
the inherent flexibility which is provided by the concept of substitutability within the 
statutory definition of "market" in s.3(1 A) of the Commerce Act and s.4E of the Trade 
Practices Act should be tempered against an increased emphasis upon the commercial 
realities of the particular factual situation involved in any such proceedings. In the words 
of the United States Supreme Court, a "pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the 
relevant market" is required, rather than a purely "formal legalistic one."230 
Such an approach would perhaps be achieved where the parties to proceedings are required 
to present evidence as to the commercial facts of that particular industry rather than 
theoretical possibilities.231 Then, as a starting point the market could be narrowly defined 
as the goods or services which are the subject of the dispute between the parties. It must 
be emphasised, however, that this is only a starting point in the market delineation process, 
for in the past certain Australian courts and tribunals have fallen into the trap of linking the 
relevant product market with those particular goods or services supplied by the defendant 
without conducting a proper inquiry as to whether such a market is really self-contained or 
whether it might be part of a larger market.232 
The next step would be to ascertain from those who supply the goods or services in 
question and those who consume such goods or services, the identity of existing 
competitors. It should then be possible to ascertain from those existing competitors the 
230 
231 
232 
Brown Shoe Co. Inc v United States 370 US 294, 336 ( 1962). This passage was cited with 
approval by Pincus J. in Australia Meat /-loldinxs Pty Ltd v TPC (1989) ATPR ~40-932. 50.105. 
See, M. Brunt. .. · Market Definition· Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices 
Litigation." above n.42, 153-154; J.D. Heydon. Trade Practices Law . above n.71, vol I. 1571 -
1572; G. deQ. Walker, "Geographical Market Definition in Competition Law". 13 Fed.L.R. 299, 
322 ( 1983). 
Sec. e.g., Top Performance Mowrs Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Q ld) Pty Ltd (1975) ATPR ~40-004 (where 
the relevant product market was found to he the brand name market for Datsun vehicles): McLean 
v Shell Chemical (A ust) Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR ~40-462 (where the relevant product market was 
found to he that for the raw material Cypermethrin used in the production of an insect killing 
chemical for use on sheep); Warman Internalio11al v Envirotech Australia Pty Lid ( I 986) ATPR 
~40-714 (where the relevant product market was found to he that for slurry pumps and their 
replacement parts); and Williams v Paper save Pty Ltd ( I 987) ATPR ~40-871 (where the relevant 
product market was found Lo he the collection and treatment of waste computer paper in the inner 
Sydney metropolit.an area.) See also. G. deQ. Walker, "Product Market Definition In Competition 
Law," above n. 12, 389-390. 
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identity of likely potential competitors. The identity of those potential competitors would 
of course be dependent upon the existence and height of barriers to entry. However, 
before the market boundary is extended to include those potential entrants, it should be 
demonstrated that the threat of new entry is more than ephemeral; it must act as a real 
constraint on the conduct of existing competitors.233 
This pragmatic and factual approach to market definition would not necessarily result in 
clearly defined markets in every case, but it would result in a relevant market being defined 
in such a way as to only include near substitutes rather than remote substitutes for the 
products supplied by the defendant. It is submitted, therefore, that such an approach 
would reflect the commercial realities of that particular industry as it is only near substitutes 
that will constrain the conduct of the defendant in the market place. 
Such a flexible approach to market definition may perhaps be subject to criticism on the 
basis that it would create uncertainty and inconsistency within Australian and New Zealand 
competition law. However, the force of any such criticism is greatly diminished when it 
is realised that the subjective nature of the present market delineation process does not in 
truth guarantee results which are any more certain or predictable. 234 
Lawyers for their part should ensure that claims of substitutability which are presented 
during such proceedings are based on "commercial common sense"235 and the realities of 
commercial behaviour in that industry. They need to simplify the issue for the court rather 
than engage in theoretical speculation as to substitution possibilities. In this regard, the 
following observations of a United States practitioner prove to be most enlightening236: 
233 
234 
235 
236 
"Testimony by economic witnesses is expert opinion testimony, which 
means that in almost every case your expert and the other side's expert will 
be drawing competing inferences from the same basic set of facts. The 
more complex the issues, the more likely that the judge or jury or 
commission or tribunal will react ... by basically disregarding the 
conflicting economic testimony. This is why the cardinal rule for litigators 
and economists in antitrust cases should be to simplify - not to 
Sec, above n.83. See also, R. Pitofsky, "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on 
Antitrust", above n.64, 1861-1862; P.E. Arccda & D.F. Turner. Antitrnst Law. above n.95. vol 
ll, 349-350. 
See. above n.229. 
See. Commerce Amendment Act 1990. s.3( I A). 
J .S. Kingdon. "Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases: An American Litigator's Perspective" 
f 1987] European Competition Law Review 371. 381. 
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oversimplify, but to simplify - the economic issues as much as possible, 
and to present them in plain, common sense terms." (Emphasis added) 
62 
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